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Abstract
While more and more data is stored and accessed electronically, better access
control methods need to be implemented for computer security. Formal modelling
and analysis have been successfully used in certain areas of computer systems, such
as verifying the security properties of cryptographic and authentication protocols.
However, formal models for computer systems in cyberspace, like networks, have
hardly advanced. A highly regarded graduate textbook cites the Take-Grant model
created in 1977 as one of the “current” examples of security modelling and analysis
techniques. This model is rarely used in practice though.
This research implements the Take-Grant Protection model’s four de jure rules
and Can Share predicate in the Prototype Verification System (PVS) which automates
model checking and theorem proving. This facilitates the ability to test a given Take-
Grant model against many systems which are modelled using digraphs. Two models,
one with error checking and one without, are created to implement take-grant rules.
The first model that does not have error checking incorporated requires manual error
checking. The second model uses recursion to allow for the error checking. The
Can Share theorem requires further development.
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Applying Automated Theorem Proving
To Computer Security
I. Introduction
1.1 Background
Formal modelling and analysis have long been successfully used to establish
the security properties of cryptographic and authentication protocols [SM93]. Those
methods have seen steady progress in the methods and fundamental theories they are
based on as well as continued usage demonstrating their value for certain classes of
systems. However, formal modelling and analysis of security properties of systems in
cyberspace, such as networks, have not significantly advanced since the 1980’s [BM07].
The concept of cybercraft or cybertargeting is so recent, very few formal models
have been proposed. One paper, “Towards Formal Specification and Verification in
Cyberspace” [APN01], which describes a formal model for a simple agent architecture
in a multi-agent system offers, a manual algorithm for model checking. Apart from
this 2001 model, very few models have been proposed for cybercraft or cybertargeting.
However, there are several companies researching how best to apply formal models
to secure cyberspace. The Oak Ridge National Laboratory (ORNL), whose mission
is to “conduct basic-applied research toward building truly secure, trusted systems
beyond best practices,” uses formal models to model system security [Oak08].
Nonetheless a highly regarded graduate textbook in this area, [Bis03] for exam-
ple, uses the Take-Grant model (1977) and the Schematic Protection Model (1988)
as “current” examples of security modelling and analysis techniques [BM07]. Even
though improvements have been made, these models are rarely used in practice to
analyze real systems and no other proposed models have significantly improved the
capability to analyze system security properties. The demonstrated usefulness of
formal modelling and analysis in the security and safety of protocols and the corre-
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sponding slow progress in establishing analogous properties in the cyber arena indicate
a new approach may be warranted [BM07].
1.2 Goals of Research
The fundamental goal of this research is to develop a consistent logical frame-
work which allows formal modelling, analysis and reasoning concerning cyberspace
security. To do this, the well known and defined Take-Grant Protection model is used
as a prototype security policy.
The first goal is to automate the Take-Grant rules, so applying them to realistic
problems is easier. The Prototype Verification System (PVS) from SRI [SRI08] uses
a combination model checker/theorem prover as a reasoning “engine” and is used to
automate this process.
The second goal is to prove the consistency of formal model specifications and
prove an application of the rules produces a valid Take-Grant model.
The modelled system is specified as a digraph, with rights and privileges deter-
mined by the edges. This follows the original conception of the Take-Grant Model.
Thus, this research produces a Take-Grant protection model to correctly imple-
ment a security policy. Performance prediction, as well as identifying vulnerabilities,
identifying the operation conditions for those performance predictions can be added
to this model.
1.3 Documentation Overview
This document contains five chapters. This chapter gives background on formal
modelling and analysis of computer systems. It also defines the purpose of the research
to automate the Take-Grant Protection Model in PVS. Chapter 2 reviews current
literature and the Take-Grant model as well as current research into the Take-Grant
model. Chapter 3 specifies the two models to implement the Take-Grant model and
the description of the Can Share predicate algorithm. Chapter 4 presents the proofs
2
for the two specification models and the code to implement the Can Share algorithm.
Chapter 5 contains the conclusions of the research and identifies future research areas.
3
II. Automated Theorem Proving to Improve Computer
Security
2.1 Introduction
This chapter covers the background of computer security and formal models.
Also the current research into the Take-Grant Protection model is discussed, which
is the focus of this research. Finally current research into formal models for access
control is presented.
2.2 Background
Computer security is increasingly important as more of our data are stored andaccessed electronically, which means better access control methods need to be
implemented. Access control protects resources by explicitly enabling or restricting
the use of that resource [Nat96]. Access is generally based on a security policy which
specifies what is or is not allowed. Computer-based access controls are called logical
access controls [Nat96]. Formal models of access control policies are usually based
on propositional and predicate logic, otherwise known as classical logic, where the
“truth” about some aspect of the system is reduced to TRUE, FALSE, or UNDE-
CIDABLE. That is, a property holds (is TRUE), does not hold (is FALSE), or it
cannot be determined if it holds (is UNDECIDABLE) [BM07]. “[T]o specify, verify,
and reason about information security and information assurance, we need a right
fundamental logic system to provide us with a logical validity criterion of normative
reasoning as well as formal representation and specification language [CM06].” Fun-
damental logic must support truth-preserving and relevant reasoning in the sense of
the conditional, ampliative reasoning, semi-complete reasoning, semi-consistent rea-
soning, and normative reasoning. The essential requirements to support fundamental
logic are [CM06]:
• relevant reasoning - the premise must be relevant to the conclusion and vice
versa.
4
• truth-preserving reasoning - an argument is valid if and only if it is impossible
for all its premises to be true while its conclusion is false in the sense of the
conditional.
• ampliative reasoning - the truth of the conclusion of the reasoning should be
recognized after the completion of the reasoning process but not be invoked in
deciding the truth of premises of the reasoning.
• semi-complete and semi-consistent reasoning - understanding that the current
knowledge may be incomplete and or inconsistent in many ways, there is no
evidence for deciding the truth of either a proposition or its negation and or
whether it directly or indirectly includes contradictions.
• normative reasoning - often describes only ideal situations, even when they are
used in actual situations, therefore logic must be able to distinguish between
what ought to be done and what is the case.
Classical mathematical logic (CML) cannot satisfy any of the fundamental logic
criteria because they are not necessarily relevant, truth-preserving in the sense of
the conditional, it is circular, not ampliative, and reasoning under inconsistency is
impossible. Furthermore, since relevance between the premises and conclusion of an
argument is not accounted for by the classical validity criterion in CML, reasoning
based on CML is not necessarily relevant [CM06]. Therefore, reasoning about systems
with access control properties requires a different logic system.
Modal logic broadly defines a family of logics that capture “modes” of truth.
Modal logic considers not only truth and falsity applied to what is or is not so as
things actually stand, but considers what would be so if things were different, i.e.,
modal logic is concerned with truth or falsity in possible worlds as well as the real
one [HC96]. A mode is an expression used to qualify the truth of a judgment, generally
based on the morals applied to it [Gar07]. The best-known logics of modal logic are
Modal, Deontic, Temporal, Epistemic, and Relevance. According to [Gar07]:
• Modal logic is the logic of necessity and possibility.
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• Deontic logic is the logic of obligation, permission, and forbidden.
• Temporal logic is the logic of time-“it will be the case”, “it will always be the
case”, “it has always been the case”, and “it was the case”.
• Epistemic logic is the logic of belief and knowledge.
Relevance logic reasons about systems that have contradictory premises. Modal logics
have similar rules and a variety of symbols. They are more expressive in their expres-
sive and reasoning ability in analysis. However, the question still remains whether
they are more suitable than classical logic to accurately model protection schemes.
Even though modal logics show promise, fundamental research automating the
analysis of protection schemes based on CML still need a thorough examination as
well.
“One of the most critical and least understood aspects of protection is the
exercise of control over the movement of rights between subjects of a system [LM82].”
An access control scheme specifies the state-transition rules of a system based on that
scheme; a set of them is an access control model [TL04]. A well-known access control
model is the Take-Grant Protection Model. The Take-Grant Protection model has two
components: “a finite, labelled, directed two color graph representing the protection
state of an operating system and a finite set of graph transformation rules with which
the protection state may be changed [Sny81].” The distribution of rights among the
various subjects of a system at a given moment is called the protection state of the
system [LM82]. The Take-Grant model is made up of subjects and objects that have
rights. Only subjects can use rights to invoke protection system rules to change the
protection state of the system. Objects may hold rights, but cannot invoke rules. The
Take-Grant model has four rewriting rules called de jure rules: Take ≡ t,
Grant ≡ g, Create and Remove, which changes the protection state. The Take rule
allows the subject invoking it to obtain the rights of another subject or object it has
take rights over. The Grant rule allows a subject to grant rights it possesses to another
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subject or object, assuming it has grant rights over that subject or object. Create
forms a new subject/object and the Remove rule removes rights to a subject/object.
The following rule descriptions are due to [Bis96], and demonstrate the de jure
rules. Consider a directed protection graph in which the labelled edges represent
rights and vertices represent entities. Entities are either subjects, represented by ●,
or objects, represented by ©. Vertices that could be either subjects or objects are
represented by
⊗
. The ` symbol denotes the graph G1 can be derived from G0 in
one step.
An example of the Take rule is shown in Figure 2.1. In the protection graph G0,
let x, y, z be three distinct vertices, where x is a subject. Let there be an edge from
x to y labelled t, an edge from y to z labelled β, and α ⊆ β, where β is the set of
rights y possesses over z and α is a subset of those rights. Then the Take rule defines
a new graph G1 by adding an edge to the protection graph from x to z labelled α.
The rule is written “x takes (α to z) from y [Bis96].”
Figure 2.1: Take Rule [Bis96]
The Grant rule is shown in Figure 2.2 [Bis96]. As before, x, y, z are distinct
vertices where x is a subject. Let there be an edge from x to y labelled g, an edge
from x to z labelled β, and α ⊆ β. The Grant rule defines a new graph G1 by adding
an edge to the protection graph from y to z labelled α. The rule is written “x grants
(α to z) to y [Bis96].”
The Create rule is shown in Figure 2.3 [Bis96]. In protection graph G0, x is a
subject and α ⊆ R, where R is the set of all rights defined for this system. The Create
7
Figure 2.2: Grant Rule [Bis96]
rule defines a new graph G1 by adding a new vertex y to the graph and an edge from
x to y labelled α. The rule is written “x creates (α to a new vertex) y [Bis96].”
Figure 2.3: Create Rule [Bis96]
An example of the Remove rule is shown in Figure 2.4 [Bis96]. Let there be
an explicit edge from x to y labelled β with α ⊆ β. Then Remove defines a new
graph G1 by deleting the α labels to β. If β becomes empty as a result, the edge
itself is deleted. The rule is written “x removes (α to) y [Bis96].” The Take-Grant
Figure 2.4: Remove Rule [Bis96]
model can determine the safety of a specific system in linear time [Bis03]. A policy
is considered safe if a system never has unauthorized transfers of rights. Safety refers
to the abstract model while security refers to the implementation of the model. The
reason for the two different terms is that a safe system can be made unsecure through
implementation. The terms used specifies where the error lies [Bis03].
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2.3 Current Take-Grant Protection Model Research
The Take-Grant Protection Model has been extended in many ways, but has
yet to have modal logic applied to it. After the Take-Grant Protection Model was
introduced in 1976 the first modifications to it was by [BS79]. Transfer methods called
de jure and de facto were identified. The name de jure was given to the operations
already defined: Take, Grant, Create, Remove and the model was extended to include
de facto or implicit transfers in the operations: Post, Pass, Spy, and Find.
De jure captures the direct authority to read information while de facto transfers
refer to a user acquiring the information without getting direct authority to read
it [BS79]. The de jure rules change the protection state of the graph while the de
facto rules, model what happens when operations occur but do not change the graph
state [FB96]. The following examples of the de facto rules: Post, Pass, Spy, and Find
are from [Bis96].
An example of the Post rule is shown in Figure 2.5. [Bis96]
Figure 2.5: Post Rule [Bis96]
In a protection graph on the left, let there be an edge from x to y labelled r,
an edge from z to y labelled w. The Post rule defines the graph on the right with an
implicit edge from x to z labelled r. The rule is then written “z posts to x through
y [Bis96].”
An example of the Pass rule is shown in Figure 2.6 There is an edge from y to
x labelled w and an edge from z to y labelled r. The Pass rule defines the new graph
on the right with an implicit edge from x to z labelled r. The rule is then written “y
passes from z through x [Bis96]”.
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Figure 2.6: Pass Rule [Bis96]
The Spy rule is shown in Figure 2.7 [Bis96]. In the left protection graph there
is an edge from x to y labelled r, and an edge from y to z labelled r. The Spy rule
defines the graph on the right with an implicit edge from x to z labelled r. The rule
is written “x spies on z using y [Bis96].”
Figure 2.7: Spy Rule [Bis96]
The Find rule is shown in Figure 2.8 [Bis96]. An edge from y to x labelled w,
an edge from z to y labelled w results in a “find” which the new graph on the right
shows with an implicit edge from x to z labelled r. The rule is written “x finds from
z through y [Bis96].”
Figure 2.8: Find Rule [Bis96]
The predicate Can Know uses the de facto rules, while the predicate Can Share
uses the de jure rules [BS79]. The Can Know predicate is true when an implicit edge
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can be added by means of using the de facto rules. The Can Know is the de facto
version of Can Share [Bis95]. The Can Share predicate is true when an edge can
be explicitly added by means of using the de jure rules. In [Sny81], the predicate
Can Steal captures “the notion that a subject vertex acquires a new right without
cooperation from an original owner” while the Can Share predicate assumes cooper-
ation from all users [Sny81].
[Bis81] applies the Take-Grant Protection Model to a hierarchical protection
system with the focus on transfer of information and authority instead of rights.
Conditions are established to make the hierarchical system secure no matter how
many of its subjects are corrupt. The model was developed under the assumption
that no user should be able to break security, an assumption not present in earlier
Take-Grant models of hierarchical protection systems.
[LM82] recognized that the Take-Grant Protection Model could not enforce
unidirectional channels–information was free to flow from one subject to another, ei-
ther directly or indirectly. Because the unidirectional transfer of rights limits the
applicability of the model, [LM82] extended it to include Take-Receive which limits
the flow of rights. However, because Take-Receive method is a simplification of the
“Send-Receive” transport control mechanism used in the Operation Control protec-
tion scheme [Min78], it was not proposed as a control mechanism for a real system
but to demonstrate how to avoid necessarily symmetric flows of rights in a real sys-
tem [LM82].
Bishop combines the notion of theft with the notion of information flow be-
tween two objects extending the idea of conspiracy to the theft of information, using
the de facto rules [Bis95]. Most other papers referenced are concerned with subject
only “thefts.” A new predicate Can Snoop is the de facto version of Can Steal.
Can Snoop is true when there is no cooperation on the part of the snoopee with
the snooper. With this extension the Take-Grant Model can model very practical
concepts and is no longer simply a theoretical tool.
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Figure 2.9: Conspirators in an information flow modified from [Bis96]
The idea of “conspirators” has also been extended to information flow [Bis96].
The precise bound on the number of actors required for information to be transferred
from one vertex to another are established. Bishop demonstrated conspirators to
information flow in a small local network using the File Transfer Protocol (FTP). A
simplified example follows. Using the network configuration in Figure 2.9, the number
of conspirators needed to make a copy of the file x and place it on z is determined.
All information transfers are along implicit edges which needs the following abstract
representation [Bis96]: subjects represent hosts, objects represent files, and permission
for an entity to retrieve or access files is represented by an explicit read (r) edge from
either host to host or host to file. There are five hosts: p, q, y, v, and z.
To find the number of conspirators needed for the original protection, G0, graph
shown in Figure 2.9 a corresponding acting graph is developed. This graph consists of
vertices corresponding to access sets in the original graph G0 with edges corresponding
to paths along which the focus of each access set can pass information acting alone
[Bis96].
Given a protection graph G0 with subject vertices p, q, v, z and y, an acting
graph G1, Figure 2.10, is generated with vertices p, q, v, z and y. Each vertex in G1 is
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Figure 2.10: The corresponding acting graph
associated with the access sets I(y) and T (y) from G0 where I(y) is an initial access
set containing y and all vertices to which y initially or rw-initially spans [Bis96].
T (y) is the terminal access set containing y and all vertices to which y terminally
or rw-terminally spans [Bis96]. An initial span of a subject v0 is a tg-path between
v0 and vn with an associated word in {−→t ∗−→g
⋃
ν }, where ν is a null-span, and rw-
initially spans if there is an rwtg-path between v0 and vn with associated word in
{−→t ∗−→w }⋃{ν} [Bis96]. A terminal span of a subject v0 is a tg-path between v0 and
vn with an associated word in {−→t ∗} and rw-terminally spans if there is an rwtg-path
between v0 and vn with associated word in {−→t ∗−→r } [Bis96].
To determine the acting graph G1, the access sets have to be built for G0, which
are:
I(p) = {p} T (p) = {x} I(z) = {z, y} T (z) = {z, v, x′} I(q) = {q, y}
T (q) = {p, q, y} I(v) = {v} T (v) = {p, v} I(y) = {y} T (y) = {y}
T (y) is the maximal set of vertices from which y can obtain information, and
I(y) is the maximal set of vertices to which y can pass rights or information. These
sets are not necessarily identical and this adds significant complexity to the conspir-
acy problem [Bis96]. Next the sets 4(a, b) for each pair of vertices a and b are built
from G0 access sets. The set 4(a, b) is defined to be all vertices in I(a)
⋂
T (b) except
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those vertices y which are information gates (i.e., T (x) = I(x) = x). This means the
set 4 includes only those vertices to which the foci can pass (or receive) information
with the foci being the only actors. The non-empty sets are
4(p, q) = {p}, 4(p, v) = {p}, 4(q, y) = {y}, 4(z, q) = {y},
4(z, y) = {y}, 4(v, z) = {v}, 4(y, q) = {y}
From these sets the acting graph, G1, is built and is shown in Figure 2.10. Consider
the information flow from x to x’ in Figure 2.9. In this case, Ix = {p} and T ′x = {z}.
The only path between p and z has three vertices (p, v, and z) in Figure 2.10, so the
minimum number of actors necessary and sufficient to move the information from x
to x’ is 3 (with p, v, and u being the three actors) [Bis96].
A key factor in information security is the ability to identify useable metrics to
measure the strength of a security policy [Wan05]. One metric that can be determined
in the Take-Grant model is the amount of cooperation required to share or steal rights.
This is the number of users required to initiate rules for a particular edge to be added
to a graph.
An example follows starting with G0 shown in Figure 2.11 to demonstrate how
many conspirators are needed to witness Can Share(r,x,y,G0), which is read ‘can
subject x obtain r (read) rights over subject y’? The example is modified from [Bis03].
Figure 2.11: A Take-Grant Protection Graph: G0
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The first conspirator is e which grants (r to y) to d, as shown in Figure 2.12.
Figure 2.12: First conspirator: e
The second conspirator, c, takes r to y from d, as shown in Figure 2.13.
Figure 2.13: Second conspirator: c
Then c grants (r to y) to b, as shown in Figure 2.14.
Figure 2.14: C conspires twice
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The third conspirator is b which grants (r to y) to a, as shown in Figure 2.15,
and
Figure 2.15: Third conspirator: b
finally, the last conspirator x takes (r to y) from a, is shown in Figure 2.16
Figure 2.16: Conspiracy Graph: G1, with x as the last conspirator
[Sny81] derived exact conspiracy measurements for arbitrary protection graphs
and presented the first algorithm for discovering minimum conspiracy. This conspiracy
graph can be evaluated in linear-time, and requires n2 operations for an n subject
graph to fill the edges.
The Take-Grant model has also been represented as a Petri net [Mar93]. A Petri
net is a “graph with two types of nodes (bipartite graphs), transitions and places,
where the arcs connect either transitions to places or places to transitions [JMS06].”
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By implementing the Take-Grant model in a Petri net it is shown there is an efficient
algorithm to determine the cooperation required to share or steal rights in linear
time. The algorithm found all rights a subject can steal with the help of a given set
of conspirators to be 3n + O(L) where L is the number of labels Take ≡ t and Grant
≡ g in the initial protection graph [Mar93].
2.4 Current Research
The demonstrated usefulness of formal modelling and analysis in the security
and safety of protocols and the corresponding lack of progress in establishing analo-
gous properties in the cyber arena indicate a new approach may be warranted [BM07].
A protection model that can verify whether a given protection scheme correctly
implements a security policy, performance prediction, as well as identifying vulner-
abilities, identifying the operation condition assumptions for those performance pre-
dictions may require a form of modal logic be applied to overcome the deficiencies of
classical mathematical logic.
To implement access control, a security policy must be defined. Leiwo [LZ97]
and Cuppens [CS96] use formal models to define security policies. Leiwo’s [LZ97] for-
mal model documents and standardize information security requirements by dividing
security into objectives, strategies, and policies that are refined into concrete protec-
tion measure specifications. “The model assumes a hierarchical, layered, information
security development organization and specifies vertical and horizontal harmonization
functions in order to establish cost effective protection [LZ97].” The vertical dimen-
sion provides each layer a common view of requirements. The horizontal dimension
identifies similar security requirements at each layer which simplifies their implemen-
tation and maintenance. This approach starts with a formal model that incorpo-
rates the total security requirements to establish cost effective protection. Whereas
Leiwo [LZ97] focuses on defining the security policy, Cuppens [CS96] focuses on the
formalization of security policies with language specifications.
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Cuppens scheme is domain-independent and reusable. Consider a generic cor-
porate multilevel security policy whose objective is to determine if the policy system
conforms to a specific set of regulations. A regulation may be viewed as being com-
posed of agents, events, and objects of the system to be regulated. Regulations defin-
ing what actions of the agents are permitted, obliged or prohibited to do [CS96]. Two
classes of constraints are identified: agent enforced constraints on actions on system
objects and agent enforced constraints on interaction with other agents [CS96]. To
describe the regulations, a logic based approach is used that incorporates deontic and
temporal modal logic concepts with organizational concepts of responsibility, delega-
tion, actions and events. For example, “Every organization which holds some secret
documents is obliged [deontic] to designate an agent who is responsible [organi-
zational] for preserving these documents” and “Before [temporal] every meeting
[event], the organizer of this meeting is obliged [deontic] to establish [action] a list
of all participants in this meeting [CS96]”. Violations of policy can also be specified
in this model.
La Padula [Pad90] discusses a domain-independent formal model which imple-
ments a new approach to computer security using the “Unified Access Control” (UAC)
framework developed at MITRE. UAC permits flexibility in choosing and specifying
security policies for a secure system because all access control is based on a small
set of fundamental concepts. The UAC framework is generalized for “computer ac-
cess control and explicitly recognizes the fundamental components for access control-
attributes, rules, and authority, and relates them in a utilitarian manner [Pad90].”
The only difference in the formal model (which is derived from the UAC framework)
compared to traditional models is that the rules for access control are a separate
entity from the model of the Trusted Computing Base (TCB) where certain sub-
jects, objects, processes, are exempt from the security policy so as to carry out their
functions [Pad90]. The model does not encumber rules with the details of an actual
system, allows the reconfiguration of security policies without reevaluating assurance,
and has flexibility in implementation.
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The security policy should describe the type of access control to be implemented
in the system. Kolaczek [Kol02] realizes the limitations of traditional access control
and applies deontic logic to role-based access control (RBAC), which is based on the
job a user holds, not the user’s identity. Typical RBAC would simply either allow
access or not. However, in reality that is generally not how access is qualified, which
the use of deontic logic allows. Attribute based access control (ABAC), grants access
control based on attributes associated with the user and typically uses temporal and
deontic logic. However, most security policies focus on access control which does not
necessarily protect the flow of information.
Sabelfield [SM03] compared three decades of research on information-flow secu-
rity, focusing mostly on work that uses static program analysis to enforce information-
flow policies. He concludes that current security measures such as access control and
encryption do not restrict information flow and neither do language-based techniques,
in particular, program semantics and analysis for the specification and enforcement
of security policies for data confidentiality [SM03].
Thus information flow along with access control are both needed. The Take-
Grant model, with de jure and de facto rules, can support a formal model that consid-
ers both those needs. Current research suggests applying modal logic to formal models
may be necessary to significantly advance formal security modelling capabilities.
2.5 Summary
This chapter covered formal modelling and why it is necessary for security poli-
cies, which essentially determines access control for a system. The Take-Grant Pro-
tection model rules used in this research were also discussed.
Current research focuses on the methods of access control, that do not protect
information flow. However, the Take-Grant Protection model has rules to determine
information flow along with access control, thereby adding extra validity for it as a
security policy prototype.
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III. Specifying the Take-Grant Model in PVS
3.1 Introduction
“Specification language, theorem provers, and models checkers are beginning to
be used routinely in industry [HR04].” This research specifies the Take-Grant Pro-
tection Model in the Prototype Verification System (PVS), a well-known verification
system [For03]. PVS uses a specification language to express mathematical theorems
and conjectures based on a system definition, which can be discharged using the in-
teractive theorem prover. The specification language has a rich and expressive logic,
and can formulate and examine problems in computer science; however, it does not
provide built-in notions of “state,” “state variable,” or “variable assignment” [For03].
These computational notions have to be modelled explicitly by encoding the seman-
tics of state machines and their transitional relations within the specifications. The
PVS theorem prover is interactive and based on a sequent calculus. One of the main
uses of PVS has been to explore synergies between expressive logic and proof automa-
tion [For03]. Because PVS is free of specific notions of computation, it is an ideal
platform to examine the Take-Grant Protection Model. Using PVS, the behavior of
Take-Grant is validated for a specified graph.
Two separate specifications are developed for each of the Take-Grant rules:
Take, Grant, Create, and Remove. Both use a digraph for model entities. Both spec-
ifications are subject only. The first specification is based on the Take-Grant theorem
directly. The second uses recursion and case statements to check the specified Take-
Grant graph for validity. Because the Take-Grant rules have common functions, code
for each rule was divided into parameterized theory modules and imported into the
rule theories. This chapter is composed of two model specification sections, with the
common imported theories and rule theories making up subsections under those. The
final two sections present the Can Share section and a section discussing contributions
made to the PVS digraph library.
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3.2 Take-Grant Model One - No Error Checking
3.2.1 Common Imported Theories. In PVS, a specification consists of a
collection of theories, which may contain the type names and constants, axioms, def-
initions, and theorems associated with the specification [OSRSC99a]. Theories are
imported by theory name and not by file name. Different files having the same the-
ory name will cause errors. To avoid duplication, seven theories are developed that
can be imported to use with the Take-Grant rules depending on the specification.
Those theories are Definitions, Add Edge, Take Graph Init, Grant Graph Init, Re-
moveEdge, TG Lemma Init Take, and TG Lemma Init Grant.
Definitions Theory
This theory in List 3.1 contains all the declared types and constants, along with
a single axiom. This theory is used in all four rules.
List 3.1: Definitions Theory
%Part 1:
Definitions[Vertex:Type +]: THEORY
% Definition file: used with all the rules
BEGIN
%Part 2:
Importing digraphs@digraphs[Vertex]
%Part 3: declares TYPE of rights
Rights : TYPE = {read , write , take , grant}
%Part 4: declares a function given an edge returns the rights that...
belong to it
E_DB: TYPE = function[edgetype[Vertex]->set[Rights ]]
%Part 5: Vertex ’s that can be used in the graph
X,Y,Z,A: Vertex
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%Part 6: Variable that contains all rights
all_rights : Rights
%Part 7: AXIOM : which states the vertex aren ’t equal.
not_eq_ax : AXIOM X/=Y and Y/=Z and Z/=X and X/=A and A/=Y and ...
A/=Z
%Part 8:
END Definitions
Part 1 names the theory and declares a non-empty parameter type Vertex.
Because the Take-Grant rules are specified using a graph, each subject is of type
Vertex. BEGIN declares the beginning of the theory.
Part 2 imports the digraph theory and all diagraph functions instantiated for
the Vertex type. Digraph was developed by NASA Langley.
Part 3 declares an enumerated type called Rights with elements: read, write,
take, or grant.
Part 4 declares a type E DB which serves as an edge database. E DB is a
function which returns the set of rights for a given edge. For instance, if an edgetype
edge (X, Y), where X and Y are type Vertex, is initialized with read and take rights,
E DB(edge(X, Y)) would return read, take.
Part 5 declares all the four graph vertices as constants.
Part 6 declares all variable all rights to contain the four rights read, write, take,
grant.
Part 7 defines the axiom not eq ax used in the Take-Grant specifications. This
axiom states that all the vertices are different.
Part 8 ends the Definitions Theory with the keyword END and the theory
name.
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Add Edge Theory
List 3.2, Add Edge, contains all the functions to add edges and vertices to the
graph, along with assigning rights to edges. Add Edge is used by the Take, Grant
and Create rules. In the following, only those aspects of the PVS specification not
previously discussed is covered.
List 3.2: Add Edge Theory
%Part1:
Add_Edge [Vertex:Type +]: THEORY BEGIN
%Part 2:
Importing Definitions[Vertex]
%Part 3: Adds a new edge to graph
AddEdge(g1: digraph , x: Vertex , y: Vertex):
digraph[Vertex ] =
if vert(g1)(x) and vert(g1)(y)
then g1 with [edges := add((x,y),edges(g1))]
else g1
endif
%Part 4: Adds a right to the new edge
AddEdgeRight(db: E_DB , x: Vertex , y: Vertex , r: Rights):
E_DB = db with [(x,y):= add(r, emptyset[Rights ])]
%Part 5: Adds all rights to the new edge
AddEdgeAllRights(db: E_DB , x: Vertex , y: Vertex):
E_DB = db with [(x,y):=
add(read ,add(write , add(take , add(grant , emptyset[Rights ]))))]
%Part 6: For Adding Verts
AddVert(g1:digraph , x:Vertex):
digraph[Vertex ] =
if vert(g1)(x)
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then g1
else g1 with [vert := add(x,vert(g1))]
endif
%Part 7:
END Add_Edge
The AddEdge function in Part 3 adds a new edge to the digraph. The function
takes a digraph and two vertices. If both vertices exist in the graph, the new edge is
returned, otherwise the graph is returned unchanged.
In Part 4, AddEdgeRight takes an edge database, E DB, and two vertices. The
two vertices define the edge that rights are assigned to. E DB is returned with updates
to the specified edge.
The AddEdgeAllRights function in Part 5 takes an edge database E DB, two
vertices, and rights and returns E DB with the specified edge containing all rights.
In Part 6, the AddV ert function is used for the Create Rule. It takes a digraph
and a vertex. If the vertex exists, the digraph is returned with no changes, if it does
not exist then the vertex is added to the graph and the updated digraph is returned.
Graph Init Theory
This theory shown in List 3.3 initializes the digraph and the edge database for
the Take rule. It is used by the Take, Create, and Remove rules. Create and Remove
digraphs can be initialized with any configuration.
List 3.3: Graph Init Theory
%Part 1:
Graph_Init [Vertex:Type +]: THEORY
%Initializes the graph for the Take Rule
BEGIN
%Part 2:
Importing Definitions[Vertex]
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%Part 3: Initialize graph
InitGraph : digraph[Vertex ] =
(#vert := add(X, add(Y, singleton[Vertex ](Z))),
edges := add((X,Y),add((Y,Z),emptyset[edgetype ]))#)
%Part 4: initializes the edge rights
ADD(db: E_DB): E_DB = db
with [(X,Y):= add(take , emptyset[Rights ])]
with [(Y,Z):= add(read ,emptyset[Rights ])]
%Part 5:
END Graph_Init
Part 3 InitGraph initializes the digraph for the Take rule by first adding the
vertices X, Y and Z to the graph and the edges (X, Y) and (Y, Z).
In part 4, ADD initializes the right database for the graph declared in InitGraph.
To the edge (X, Y) the take right is added and to the edge (Y, Z) the read right is
added.
TG Lemma Init Take Theory
In List 3.4 the theory initializes the digraph and the edge database for the Take-
Grant Take lemma. It is used only by the Take rule. This theory is similar to the
Grant Graph Init theory, List 3.5, except the edge right is a take instead of a grant.
List 3.4: TG Lemma Init Take Theory
% Part 1:
TG_Lemma_Init_Take[Vertex:Type +]: THEORY
%Initializes the graph for the Take Take-Grant Lemma
BEGIN
%Part 2:
Importing Definitions[Vertex]
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%InitGraphL and ADDL used for Take-Grant Lemma
%Part 3: Initialize graph
InitGraphL : digraph[Vertex ] =
(#vert := add(X, add(Y, singleton[Vertex ](Z))),
edges := add((Y,X) , add((Y,Z),emptyset[edgetype ]))#)
%Part 4: initializes the edge rights
ADDL(db: E_DB): E_DB = db with [(Y,X):=
add(take , emptyset[Rights ])] with [(Y,Z):= add(read ,emptyset[...
Rights ])]
%Part 5:
END TG_Lemma_Init_Take
In part 3, InitGraphL, initializes the digraph for the Take-Grant Take lemma
and adds the vertices X, Y and Z to the graph. And the edges (Y, X) and (Y, Z).
ADDL, in part 4, initializes the right database for the graph declared in InitGraphL.
The take right is added to the edge (Y,X) and read is added to the edge (Y, Z).
Grant Graph Init Theory
This theory initializes the digraph and the edge database for the Grant rule in
List 3.5. It is used only by the Grant rule for this specification.
List 3.5: Grant Graph Init Theory
%Part 1:
Grant_Graph_Init [Vertex:Type +]: THEORY
%Initializes the graph for the Grant rule
BEGIN
%Part 2:
Importing Definitions[Vertex]
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%Part 3: Initialize graph
InitGraph : digraph[Vertex ] =
(#vert := add(X, add(Y, singleton[Vertex ](Z))),
edges := add((Y,X),add((Y,Z),emptyset[edgetype ]))#)
%Part 4: initializes the edge rights
ADD(db: E_DB): E_DB = db
with [(Y,X):= add(grant ,emptyset[Rights ])]
with [(Y,Z):= add(read ,emptyset[Rights ])]
%Part 5:
END Grant_Graph_Init
Part 3, InitGraph, initializes the digraph for the Take-Grant Take lemma. It adds
the vertices X, Y and Z to the graph and edges (Y, X) and (Y, Z).
ADD in Part 4 initializes the rights database for the graph declared in InitGraph.
To the edge (Y, X) grant is added and read is added to the edge (Y, Z).
TG Lemma Init Grant Theory
This theory initializes the digraph and the edge database in List 3.6 for the
Take-Grant Grant lemma. It is used only by the Grant rule in this specification.
List 3.6: TG Lemma Init Grant Theory
%Part 1:
TG_Lemma_Init_Grant [ Vertex:Type +]: THEORY
%Initializes the graph for the Grant Take-Grant Lemma
BEGIN
%Part 2:
Importing Definitions[Vertex]
%InitGraphL and ADDL used for Take-Grant Lemma
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%Part 3: Initialize graph
InitGraphL : digraph[Vertex ] =
(#vert := add(X, add(Y, singleton[Vertex ](Z))),
edges := add((X, Y) , add((Y,Z),emptyset[edgetype ]))#)
%Part 4: initializes the edge rights
ADDL(db: E_DB): E_DB = db
with [(X,Y):= add(grant ,emptyset[Rights ])]
with [(Y,Z):= add(read ,emptyset[Rights ])]
%Part 5:
END TG_Lemma_Init_Grant
Part 3 InitGraphL initializes the digraph for the Take rule. It adds the vertices
X, Y and Z to the graph. And the edges (X, Y) and (Y, Z).
Part 4 ADDL initializes the right database for the graph declared in InitGraphL.
To the edge (X, Y) the grant right is added, and to the edge (Y, Z) the read right is
added.
Remove Edge Theory
This theory, List 3.7, contains all the functions to remove edges from the digraph,
along with the rights. It is used only by the Remove rule in this specification.
List 3.7: Remove Edge Theory
%Part 1:
RemoveEdge [ Vertex : Type +]: THEORY
%Used by Remove Right
BEGIN
%Part 2:
Importing Definitions[Vertex]
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%Part 3: Removes edges
RemoveEdge(g1: digraph , e:edgetype):
digraph[Vertex ] = g1 with [edges := remove(e,edges(g1))]
%Part 4: Removes rights to an edge
RemoveEdgeRight(db: E_DB , e:edgetype , r: Rights):
E_DB = db with [(e‘1,e‘2):= remove(r, db(e))]
%Part 5:
END RemoveEdge
The RemoveEdge function, Part 3, takes a digraph and an edgetype, which is an edge
in the digraph, and returns the digraph after the edge is removed from the digraph’s
set of edges.
In part 4, RemoveEdgeRight, takes the edge database, an edgetype, and a right
and returns the edge database with the right removed from the edge.
3.2.2 Take Rule. The theory TakeRule defines theorems that establish
whether, given a digraph, X can take read right to Z or take(read, X, Z, graph) as
explained in List 3.8.
List 3.8: Take Rule
%Part 1: SUBJECT ONLY: Rule defined 3 node graph
TakeRule [ Vertex : Type +]: THEORY
BEGIN
%Part 2:
Importing Definitions[Vertex]
Importing Graph_Init[Vertex]
Importing Add_Edge[Vertex]
Importing TG_Lemma_Init_Take[Vertex]
%Part 3: does edge (X,Y) have a take right
t_edge_in ?: bool = FORALL(db:E_DB):
edge?( InitGraph)(X,Y) and member(take ,(ADD(db)(X,Y)))
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%Part 4: does edge(Y,Z) have a read right
r_edge_in ?: bool = FORALL(db:E_DB):
edge?( InitGraph)(Y,Z) and member(read ,(ADD(db)(Y,Z)))
%Part 5: does edge (Y,X) have a take right
t_edge_in_for_tg_L ?: bool = FORALL(db:E_DB):
edge?( InitGraphL)(Y,X) and member(take ,(ADDL(db)(Y,X)))
%Part 6: does edge(Y,Z) have a read right
r_edge_in_for_tg_L ?: bool = FORALL(db:E_DB):
edge?( InitGraphL)(Y,Z) and member(read ,(ADDL(db)(Y,Z)))
%Part 7: adds the new edge into the graph
edge_taken : bool = FORALL(db:E_DB):
edge?( AddEdge(InitGraph , X, Z))(X,Z) and
member(read ,( AddEdgeRight(ADD(db) , X, Z, read)(X,Z)))
%Part 8: adds the new edge into the graph for the T-G Lemma
edge_taken_L : bool = FORALL(db:E_DB):
edge?( AddEdge(InitGraphL , X, Z))(X,Z) and
member(read ,( AddEdgeRight(ADDL(db) , X, Z, read)(X,Z)))
%THEOREMS:
%Part 9: %Original Take-Grant rule(TAKE , X, Z, read)
Take_Edge : THEOREM
(t_edge_in ? and r_edge_in ?) iff edge_taken
%Part 10: %used for the Take-Grant Lemma (Take X, Z, read)
Take_Edge_L : THEOREM
(t_edge_in_for_tg_L ? and r_edge_in_for_tg_L ?) iff edge_taken_L
%Part 11:
END TakeRule
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In Part3 t edge in? returns true or false depending on whether edge (X, Y) is
in the digraph and has the take right. edge?(InitGraph)(X, Y) calls InitGraph
which initializes and returns the graph which the edge? function from the digraphs
library uses to determine if edge (X, Y) is in the digraph. Function member(take,
(ADD(db)(X, Y))) calls ADD which initializes the rights the edges have, while
member determines if the take right is a member of the edge (X, Y).
The r edge in? function in Part 4 is the same as Part 3 except it checks for the
read right in edge (Y, Z).
The function t edge in for tg L? in Part 5 returns true or false depending on
if the edge (Y, X) is in the digraph and has the take right. edge?(InitGraphL)(Y,
X) calls InitGraphL declaration to initialize the graph then edge? from the di-
graphs library determines if the edge (Y, X) is in the digraph. The member(take,
(ADDL(db)(Y, X))) calls the ADDL declaration which initializes what rights the
edges have, then member determines if take belongs to the edge (Y, X).
Part 6 r edge in for tg L? is the same as Part 5 except it checks for the read
right in edge (Y, Z).
In edge taken, Part 7, returns true if the edge (X, Z) is in the digraph and that
edge has the read right. The function: edge?(AddEdge(InitGraph, X, Z))(X, Z)
initializes the digraph adds edge (X, Z). The function member(read,(AddEdgeRight(
ADD(db), X, Z, read)(X, Z))) initializes rights to the current edges in the digraph
then calls AddEdgeRight to add a right to the new edge. The member command
checks to make sure it was added.
The function edge taken L, Part 8, is the same as edge taken, Part 7, but uses
the lemma graph.
Part 9 and 10 are the theorems for the Take rule.
The first theorem, Part 9 Take Edge, proves the original Take-Grant Take rule.
The theorem says if and only if (for the digraph in question) there is a take edge from
X to Y and a read edge from Y to Z can the edge be taken. In this case edge (X, Y)’s
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right is take and edge(Y, Z) has read. To simplify the theorem using the labels of the
boolean functions already defined it is written (t edge in? and r edge in?) iff
edge taken. Figure 3.1 shows how the theorem transforms the original graph.
Figure 3.1: Results of theorem Take Edge
The second theorem Take Edge L in Part 10 is used to prove the lemma to the
Take-Grant Take rule. The theorem says that if and only if, for the chosen digraph,
there is a take edge from Y to X and a read edge from Y to Z in the digraph can
the edge be taken. To simplify the theorem using the labels of the boolean functions
already defined is written as (t edge in for tg L? and r edge in for tg L?) iff
edge taken L and shown in Figure 3.2.
Figure 3.2: Results of theorem Take Edge L
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3.2.3 Grant Rule. The GrantRule theory, List 3.9, is true if in the digraph
specified X is granted read to Z. In this example, Y grants read to Z to X.
List 3.9: Grant Rule
%Part 1:
GrantRule [ Vertex:Type +]: THEORY
%SUBJECT ONLY: Rule defined 3 node graph
BEGIN
%Part 2:
Importing Definitions[Vertex]
Importing Grant_Graph_Init[Vertex]
Importing Add_Edge[Vertex]
Importing TG_Lemma_Init_Grant[Vertex]
%Part 3: does edge (Y,X) have a grant right
g_edge_in ?: bool = FORALL(db:E_DB):
edge?( InitGraph)(Y,X) and member(grant ,(ADD(db)(Y,X)))
%Part 4: does edge(Y,Z) have a read right
r_edge_in ?: bool = FORALL(db:E_DB):
edge?( InitGraph)(Y,Z) and member(read ,(ADD(db)(Y,Z)))
%Part 5: does edge (X,Y) have a grant right
g_edge_in_for_tg_L : bool = FORALL(db:E_DB):
edge?( InitGraphL)(X,Y) and member(grant ,(ADDL(db)(X,Y)))
%Part 6: does edge(Y,Z) have a read right
r_edge_in_for_tg_L : bool = FORALL(db:E_DB):
edge?( InitGraphL)(Y,Z) and member(read ,(ADDL(db)(Y,Z)))
33
%Part 7: adds the new edge into the graph
edge_granted : bool = FORALL(db:E_DB):
edge?( AddEdge(InitGraph , X, Z))(X,Z) and
member(read ,( AddEdgeRight(ADD(db) , X, Z, read)(X,Z)))
%Part 8: adds the new edge into the graph
edge_granted_L : bool = FORALL(db:E_DB):
edge?( AddEdge(InitGraph , X, Z))(X,Z) and
member(read ,( AddEdgeRight(ADDL(db) , X, Z, read)(X,Z)))
%THEOREMS:
%Part 9: Original Take-Grant rule(Grant X, Z, read)
Grant_Edge : THEOREM
(g_edge_in ? and r_edge_in ?) iff edge_granted
%Part 10: Used in the Take-Grant Lemma (Grant X, Z, read)
Grant_Edge_L : THEOREM
(g_edge_in_for_tg_L and r_edge_in_for_tg_L)
iff edge_granted_L
%Part 11:
END GrantRule
The function g edge in? in Part 3 returns true only if the edge (Y,X) is in
the digraph and has the grant right. edge?(InitGraph)(Y, X) calls InitGraph to
initialize the graph, then uses edge? function from the digraphs library determines if
the edge (Y, X) is in the digraph. The member(grant, (ADD(db)(Y, X))) calls
the ADD declaration which initializes what rights the edges have, then member from
the sets library determine if grant belongs to the edge (Y, X).
Part 4 r edge in? is the same as Part 3 except it checks for the read right in
edge (Y, Z).
In Part 5, g edge in for tg L?, returns true or false depending on whether the
edge (X, Y) is in the digraph and has the grant right. edge?(InitGraphL)(X, Y)
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calls InitGraphL which initializes and returns the graph which the edge? function
from the digraphs library uses to determine if edge (X, Y) is in the digraph. Function
member(grant, (ADDL(db)(X, Y))) calls ADDL which initializes the rights
edges have, then the member function determines if the grant right is a member of
the edge (X, Y).
The function r edge in for tg L? in Part 6 is the same as Part 5 except it checks
for the read right in edge (Y,Z).
The edge granted function in Part 7 is true when the edge (X, Z) is in the
digraph and has the read right. The function edge?(AddEdge(InitGraph, X,
Z))(X, Z) initializes the digraph then adds edge (X, Z) to it. The function mem-
ber(read,(AddEdgeRight(ADD(db), X, Z, read)(X, Z))) initializes the rights
to the current edges in the digraph and calls AddEdgeRight to add a right to the
new edge. The member command checks to make sure it was added.
In Part 8 edge granted L is the same as edge granted but uses the lemma graph.
Part 9 and 10 are the theorems for the Grant rule.
Figure 3.3: Results of theorem Grant Edge
The first theorem in Part 9, Grant Edge, proves the original Take-Grant Grant
rule. The theorem says that if and only if (for the current digraph) there is a grant
edge and a read edge from X to Z in the digraph can the edge be granted. To
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simplify the theorem using the labels of the boolean functions already defined it is
written (g edge in? and r edge in?) iff edge granted. Figure 3.3 shows how
the theorem transforms the original graph.
The second theorem Grant Edge L in Part 10 proves a lemma for the Take-
Grant Grant rule. The theorem says that if and only if (for the initialized di-
graph) there is a grant edge and a read edge from X to Z in the digraph can the
edge be granted. To simplify the theorem using the labels of the boolean func-
tions already defined it is written (g edge in for tg L and r edge in for tg L)
iff edge granted L and is shown in Figure 3.4
Figure 3.4: Results of theorem Grant Edge L
3.2.4 Create Rule. The CreateRule theory, List 3.10 returns true or false if
the vertex specified X can create vertex A and give the new edge (X, A) all the rights.
Written as create(allrights, X, A, graph), where all rights are read, write, take, and
grant.
List 3.10: Create Rule
%Part 1: %SUBJECT ONLY: Rule defined
CreateRule [ Vertex : TYPE + ]: THEORY
BEGIN
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%Part 2:
Importing Definitions[Vertex]
Importing Graph_Init[Vertex]
Importing Add_Edge[Vertex]
%Part 3: checks to see if vert exists that is doing the creation
v_exists ?: bool = member(X, vert(InitGraph))
%Part 4: checks to see if vert to be created exists
new_v_not_exists ?: bool = FORALL(A:Vertex|A/=X and A/=Y and A/=Z):
not member(A, vert(InitGraph))
%Part 5: new vert is created
v_created : bool = FORALL(A:Vertex|A/=X and A/=Y and A/=Z):
member(A, vert(AddVert(InitGraph , A)))
%Part 6: new edge is created
e_created : bool = FORALL(A:Vertex|A/=X and A/=Y and A/=Z):
edge?( AddEdge(AddVert(InitGraph , A),X, A))(X,A)
%Part 7: new edge has allrights added to it
e_r_created:bool = FORALL(db:E_DB):
member(all_rights ,( AddEdgeAllRights(ADD(db) , X, A)(X,A)))
%Part 8: ( Create ,X,A, allrights) - allrights =(r,w,t,g)
Create_Vert_Right : THEOREM
(( v_exists ? and new_v_not_exists ?) iff v_created)
implies ( e_created and e_r_created)
%Part 9: ( Create ,X,A, allrights) - allrights =(r,w,t,g)
Created : THEOREM
(v_exists ? and new_v_not_exists ?) implies
(v_created and e_created and e_r_created)
%Part 10:
END CreateRule
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The function v exists? in Part 3 returns true or false based on whether the ver-
tex doing the creating exists in the digraph. Function member(X, vert(InitGraph))
checks that X is in the graph.
In Part 4, new v not exists? returns true or false depending on if the vertex
to be created is already a member of the digraph. This function states that all
vertices are not equal with a FORALL declaration: FORALL(A:Vertex—A/=X
and A/=Y and A/=Z). The digraph is initialized and through the negation of the
member function A it is determined A is not part of the digraph. This function is
not member(A, vert(InitGraph)).
Part 5 v created returns true if the new vertex was successfully added to the
digraph. In function member(A, vert(AddVert(InitGraph, A))) the graph is
initialized, then the AddV ert function is called with that digraph and the vertex to
add A. Once the vertex is created, the member function checks to see if the vertex
was added.
The e created function in Part 6 is true if the new edge was successfully created
from the creating vertex to the new vertex. The graph is initialized with InitGraph
in the function edge?(AddEdge(AddVert(InitGraph, A),X, A))(X, A) then
AddV ert and AddEdge is called. Finally edge? function confirms that the edge was
added to the digraph.
In Part 7 e r created returns true or false depending on if the new edge (X, A)
contains all the rights: read, write, take, and grant. The function
member(all rights,(AddEdgeAllRights(ADD(db), X, A)(X, A))) first initial-
izes the edge database, then AddEdgeAllRights is called with the new edge to add
rights to. Finally member checks to make sure the correct rights were added to (X,
A)’s edge database.
Part 8 and 9 are the theorems for the Create rule. Even though the two theorems
are different, the change to the graph produced by each theorem is fundamentally the
same and shown in Figure
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Create V ert Right in Part 8 is the first theorem to prove the Take-Grant Create
rule. It states that if and only if the creating vertex exists and the vertex to be
created does not then the vertex can be added to the graph, which implies that the
edge was created and all the rights were added to the new edge database. To simplify
the theorem, the boolean functions already defined were used: ((v exists? and
new v not exists?) iff v created) implies (e created and e r created).
3.5.
Figure 3.5: Create Theorem
Part 9 is the Created theorem, which uses a different approach to prove the
Take-Grant Create rule. It states that if the creation vertex exists and the vertex
to be created does not then the vertex can be added to the graph, the new edge
was created connecting the two vertices, and all the rights were added to the new
edge edge database. The theorem is written (v exists? and new v not exists?)
implies (v created and e created and e r created), since the boolean functions
were already defined.
3.2.5 Remove Rule. The RemoveRule theory in List 3.11 is true for a
specified digraph if the read right for edge (Y, Z) is removed. If there are no more
rights for that edge, the edge itself is removed. The command is written remove(Y,
Z, read).
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List 3.11: Remove Rule
%Part 1:
RemoveRule [ Vertex : TYPE + ] : THEORY
%SUBJECT ONLY: Rule defined
BEGIN
%Part 2:
Importing Definitions[Vertex]
Importing Graph_Init[Vertex]
Importing RemoveEdge[Vertex]
%Part 3: does right exist to be removed
r_exists ?: bool = FORALL(db:E_DB):
member(read ,(ADD(db)(Y,Z)))
%Part 4: does the edge exist to remove right
e_exists ?: bool = edge?( InitGraph)(Y,Z)
%Part 5: right is removed
r_removed : bool = FORALL(db:E_DB):
not member(read ,( RemoveEdgeRight(ADD(db) , (Y,Z) , read)(Y,Z)))
%Part 6: edge is removed if it has no rights
e_removed : bool = FORALL(db:E_DB):
empty ?(( RemoveEdgeRight(ADD(db) , (Y,Z) , read)(Y,Z))) iff
(not edge?( RemoveEdge(InitGraph ,(Y,Z)))(Y,Z))
%THEOREM:
%Part 7: Rule (Remove , Y,Z,read)
Remove_Right : THEOREM
(e_exists ? and r_exists ?) implies ( r_removed and e_removed)
%Part 8:
END RemoveRule
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Part 2 states the theories that Remove Rule uses is: Definitions, Take Graph Init,
and RemoveEdge. Although any graph initialization scheme could be used, Re-
moveRule uses Take Graph Init.
In Part 3, the r exists function returns true or false depending on the existence
of the right to be removed in the edge database. member(read,(ADD(db)(Y,
Z))) initially calls ADD to add all the rights to all the edges in the digraph, then
using the member function makes sure that read is a right on the (Y, Z) edge.
The function in Part 4, e exists, returns true or false based on whether the
edge the right belongs to exists in the graph. edge?(InitGraph)(Y, Z) initializes
the digraph then using the edge? function checks to see if (Y, Z) exists as an edge in
the digraph.
Part 5 r removed returns true if the edge to be removed was successfully re-
moved. r removed uses not member(read, (RemoveEdgeRight(ADD(db), (Y,
Z), read)(Y, Z))) which first calls ADD to add all the rights to the edges in the
digraph. Then it calls RemoveEdgeRight which removes the right in question. Using
not in front of the member function causes it to return true if the edge is no longer
a member in (Y, Z) right set.
The e removed function, Part 6, returns true or false depending on whether the
edge is removed if and only if it has no rights. empty?((RemoveEdgeRight(ADD(db),
(Y, Z), read)(Y, Z))) first calls ADD to add all the rights to the edges. Then calls
RemoveEdgeRight removes the right. Using the empty? function the edge right set
checks to see if its empty if and only if that is true is the second part of the spec-
ification considered. (not edge?(RemoveEdge(InitGraph,(Y, Z)))(Y, Z)) will
initialize the graph then call RemoveEdge to delete the required edge (Y,Z) and then
check by negating the edge? function to make sure it is no longer a member in the
graph.
The theorem in Part 7 proves the Remove rule: Remove Right. The theorem
says that if the right to be removed exists and the edge it exists on is in the digraph,
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this implies the right can be removed and the edge as well if the edge contains no
other rights. The theorem is simplified by using the boolean functions already defined
and looks like (e exists? and r exists?) implies (r removed and e removed).
Figure 3.6 shows how the theorem transforms the graph.
Figure 3.6: Remove Theorem
3.3 Take-Grant Model Two - Error Checking
Model two allows an arbitrary digraph to be specified. Recursion is used to
move through a case statement which allows more error checking.
3.3.1 Common Imported Theories. The theories that are imported for the
rules are listed here. Only if the theories changed between models are they explained
below. The Take Graph Init theory initializes the digraph and the edge database for
both the Take, Create, and Remove rules. The only difference is which definition
file is imported: tgDefinitions is used for the Take rule, while cDefinitions is used
by Create and rDefinitions is imported for the Remove rule. Grant Graph Init along
with Add Edge are exactly the same theories used for Model 1.
tgDefinitions Theory
The tgDefinitions theory contains all the definitions used for the Take and Grant
rule in List 3.12. In the following, only those aspects of the PVS specification that
are new are discussed.
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List 3.12: tgDefinitions Theory
%Part 1:
tgDefinitions [ Vertex : TYPE +]: THEORY
BEGIN
%Part 2:
Importing digraphs@digraphs[Vertex]
Importing digraphs@digraph_ops[Vertex]
Importing digraphs@digraph_deg[Vertex]
%Part 3: % declares TYPE of right
Rights : TYPE = {read , write , take , grant}
%Part 4: declares a function : given an edge returns the rights ...
that belong to it
E_DB: TYPE = function[edgetype[Vertex]->set[Rights ]]
%Part 5: Vertices that can be used in the graph
X,Y,Z,A: Vertex
%Part 6:
nil:Vertex
%Part 7: Program counter Type
PCT: TYPE = {L0 ,L1 ,L2 ,L3 ,L4 ,L5 ,L6 ,L7 ,LTRUE ,LFALSE ,LEND}
%Part 8: attributes for each vertex
node : TYPE = [#
dest: Vertex , % destination
source : Vertex , % source edge starts from
e1: edgetype , % an outgoing edge
ie: finite_set[edgetype ], % all incoming edges
oe: finite_set[edgetype ] % all outgoing edges
#]
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%Part 9: node database function given a vertex returns its ...
attributes
n_db: TYPE = function[Vertex -> node]
%Part 10: labelled graph attributes
L_Graph : TYPE = [#
g1: digraph[Vertex],
db: E_DB ,
PC: PCT ,
Node: n_db ,
taken: bool ,
addright : Rights ,
granted:bool
#]
%Part 11:
null: edgetype = (nil ,nil)
%Part 12: AXIOM : which states the vertices aren ’t equal
not_eq_ax : axiom X/=Y and Y/=Z and Z/=X
%Part 13:
END tgDefinitions
Part 2 imports the digraph, digraph ops, and digraph deg theories, instantiated for
the Vertex type. All of those theories were developed by NASA Langley.
Part 6 declares a nil vertex, which is used to mark dead-ends in the functions
In Part 7 the values used for the program counter are declared. These values
move the recursion through the case statement.
Part 8 declares a node type, which contains all the attributes for the node. The
attributes that each node has are: dest which contains the destination node or the
node that is used to progress down the digraph, source, which is either the same as
the node or is the node that was previously used in the state, ie which is a set of
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all incoming edges to the vertex, and oe, which is a set of all outgoing edges to the
vertex.
The node database, Part 9, declares as a function which given a vertex returns
the node attributes.
Part 10 is a type of L Graph (labelled graph) which holds all the variables for the
current state. This is the main type. The variables that L Graph has are: g1, which
is the changed digraph; db, which is the edge database; PC, which is the program
counter; Node, which contains the node database; taken, which is used for the Take
rule and will be true if the edge can be taken; addright, an addright variable; and
granted, which is used for the Grant rule and will be true if the edge can be granted.
Part 11 declares a null edgetype which is designated to be (nil,nil) an empty
edgetype
cDefinitions Theory
The cDefinitions theory in List 3.13 contains all the definitions used for the
Create rule.
List 3.13: cDefinitions Theory
%Part 1:
cDefinitions [ Vertex : Type + ] : THEORY
BEGIN
%Part 2:
Importing digraphs@digraphs[Vertex]
Importing digraphs@digraph_ops[Vertex]
Importing digraphs@digraph_deg[Vertex]
%Part 3: declares TYPE of right works
Rights : TYPE = {read , write , take , grant}
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%Part 4: declares a function given an edge returns the rights that...
belong to it
E_DB: TYPE = function[edgetype[Vertex]->set[Rights ]]
%Part 5: Vertex ’s that can be used in the graph
X,Y,Z,A,B: Vertex
%Part 6:
nil: Vertex
%Part 7:
PCT: TYPE = {L0 ,L1 , L2 , L3 , L4 ,L5 ,LTRUE ,LFALSE ,LEND}
%Part 8:
L_Graph : TYPE = [#
g1: digraph[Vertex],
db: E_DB ,
PC: PCT ,
created : bool
#]
%Part 9:
null: edgetype = (nil ,nil)
%Part 10: AXIOM : which states the vertices aren ’t equal
not_eq_ax : axiom X/=Y and Y/=Z and Z/=X and X/=A and A/=Y and A/=Z
%Part 11:
END cDefinitions
In Part 7, the PC values are not the same as tgDefinitions, so that theory
cannot be used, because there are more values than case statements you get a Type
Correctness Condition (TCC) is generated when proving.
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In Part 8, the only different between tgDefinitions is the variable created which
will be true if a new vert/edge can be created.
rDefinitions Theory
In List 3.14 the rDefinitions theory defines all the definitions used for the Remove
rule.
List 3.14: rDefinitions Theory
%Part 1:
rDefinitions [ Vertex : Type + ]: THEORY
BEGIN
%Part 2:
Importing digraphs@digraphs[Vertex]
Importing digraphs@digraph_ops[Vertex]
Importing digraphs@digraph_deg[Vertex]
%Part 3: declares TYPE of right works
Rights : TYPE = {read , write , take , grant}
%Part 4:
E_DB: TYPE = function[edgetype[Vertex]->set[Rights ]]
%Part 5:
X,Y,Z,A,B: Vertex
%Part 6:
nil: Vertex
%Part 7:
PCT: TYPE = {L0,L1,L2,L3,L4,LTRUE ,LFALSE ,LEND}
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%Part 8:
L_Graph : TYPE = [#
g1: digraph[Vertex],
db: E_DB ,
PC: PCT ,
removed : bool
#]
%Part 9: null: edgetype = (nil ,nil)
%Part 10:
not_eq_ax : axiom X/=Y and Y/=Z and Z/=X
%Part 11:
END rDefinitions
Part 7 declares the values used for the program counter. These values move the
recursion through the case statement.
Part 8 declares a type L Graph which the only difference from cDefinitions is
that removed is used instead of create. Removed is true if the right to be removed
was successfully removed.
Node ops Theory
The Node ops theory, List 3.15, defines all the operations on nodes. This theory
is used only for the Take and Grant rules.
List 3.15: Node ops Theory
%Part 1:
Node_ops [ Vertex : TYPE +]: THEORY
BEGIN
%Part 2:
Importing tgDefinitions[Vertex]
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%Part 3:
set_edge(x:Vertex ,a:edgetype , c:L_Graph ,oes: finite_set[edgetype],
ies: finite_set[edgetype ]): L_Graph = c
with [‘Node(x)‘e1:=a, ‘Node(x)‘dest := a‘2,‘Node(x)‘source :=x, ...
‘Node(x)‘oe:=oes , ‘Node(x)‘ie:=ies ]
%Part 4: %sets node attributes
get_edge(c: L_Graph , x: Vertex): L_Graph = if x=X
then set_edge(x, (X,Y) , c,outgoing_edges(x, c‘g1),...
incoming_edges(x, c‘g1))
else (if x=Y then set_edge(x,(Y,Z),c,outgoing_edges(x,
c‘g1),incoming_edges(x, c‘g1))
else set_edge(x,(Z,Z),c,outgoing_edges(x, c‘g1),...
incoming_edges(x, c‘g1))
endif) endif
%Part 5: %update node dest and source
Node_update(Node: n_db , x: Vertex , e1: Vertex , e2: Vertex):n_db =
Node with [(x)‘source := e1 ,(x)‘dest := e2]
%Part 6: %for each vertex the node attributes are set
set_Node_e1(c: L_Graph , v: finite_set[Vertex ]): recursive L_Graph=
if empty ?(v)then c
else let a = choose(v) in
set_Node_e1(get_edge(c, a) , remove(a,v))
endif measure card(v)
%Part 7:
END Node_ops
In Part 3, the set edge function sets the nodes e1, dest, source, oe and ie
variables. The e1 variable contains an edge for the node, source is set to itself, dest
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is set to the edges second value, oe contains the outgoing edges and ie contains the
nodes incoming edges.
The get edge function in Part 4 calls the set edge function. Different edges are
passed to set edge depending on which vertex was used to call get edge.
Part 5 the Node update function updates the source and destination for the
node that calls it.
In Part 6 the set Node e1 function is a recursive call to go through all the
vertices in the graph and set their node attributes.
RemoveEdge Theory
The Model 2 RemoveEdge theory, List 3.16, defines all remove edge and right
functions. it is basically the same as the RemoveEdge specification for Model 1, List
3.7, except for the Remove Edge function.
List 3.16: RemoveEdge Theory
%Part 1:
RemoveEdge [ Vertex : Type +]: THEORY
BEGIN
%Part 2:
Importing rDefinitions[Vertex]
%Part 3: For REMOVE - removes edges
RemoveEdge(g1: digraph , e:edgetype): digraph[Vertex ] = g1 with
[edges := remove(e,edges(g1))]
%Part 4: Removes rights to an edge
RemoveEdgeRight(db: E_DB , e:edgetype , r: Rights):E_DB = db with
[(e‘1,e‘2) := remove(r, db(e))]
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%Part 5: Main function call to delete edge
Remove_Edge(c:L_Graph ,e:edgetype):L_Graph =
if edge?(c‘g1)(e)
then c with [ g1:= RemoveEdge ((c‘g1),e)]
else c
endif
%Part 6:
END RemoveEdge
The Remove Edge function in Part 5 is the function that decides if the edge
needs to be removed. The functions parameters are in L Graph and an edgetype
variable. If the edge exists in the current digraph, it is removed, else the digraph is
returned with no change.
3.3.2 Take Rule. The take rule theory in List 3.17 returns true or false if in
the digraph specified, X can take read rights to Z from Y.
List 3.17: Take Rule
%Part 1:
take_rule [ Vertex : TYPE +]: THEORY
%SUBJECT ONLY
%Is used strictly for the 3 node query , which is how the rule is ...
defined.
BEGIN
%Part 2:
Importing tgDefinitions[Vertex]
Importing Graph_Init[Vertex]
Importing Node_ops[Vertex]
Importing Add_Edge[Vertex]
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%Part 3: %loop actions
%Part 3.1:
L0(c: L_Graph , x:Vertex , y:Vertex): L_Graph = c with
[g1:=InitGraph , db:= ADD(c‘db)]
%Part 3.2:
L3(c: L_Graph , x: Vertex , y:Vertex):L_Graph =
set_Node_e1(c,vert(c‘g1))
%Part 3.3:
%see if the current edge has take for a right if it does update ...
the destination and source
Take_out_edge ?(c: L_Graph , x: Vertex , n: n_db): L_Graph =
if member(take , c‘db(c‘Node(x)‘e1))
then c with [Node := Node_update(c‘Node , x, c‘Node(x)‘e1 ‘1, c‘...
Node(x)‘e1 ‘2)]
else c endif
%Part 3.4
L5(c: L_Graph , x: Vertex , r:Rights):L_Graph = c with
[Node := Node_update(c‘Node , x, c‘Node(x)‘e1 ‘1, c‘Node(x)‘e1 ‘2),
addright := r]
%Part 3.5 %adds new edge to graph , adds new edge right to ...
edge_db
L6(c: L_Graph , x: Vertex , y: Vertex , r: Rights):L_Graph = c with [
g1:= AddEdge(c‘g1 , x, y),
db:= AddEdgeRight(c‘db , x, y, r)]
%Part 3.6
LTRUE(c:L_Graph): L_Graph = c with [taken := true]
%Part 3.7
LFALSE(c:L_Graph): L_Graph = c with [taken := false]
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%Part 4: % Loop
sw(c: L_Graph , r: Rights , x: Vertex , y: Vertex): L_Graph =
Cases c‘PC of
%Part 4.1: %initializes graph and E_DB
L0:L0(c,x,y) with [PC:=L1],
%Part 4.2: % checks if first node is in graph else quit
L1: c with [PC:= if not member(x, vert(c‘g1)) then LFALSE
% checks if second node is in graph else quit
else (if not member(y, vert(c‘g1)) then LFALSE
% checks if needed edge exists else need to obtain ...
edge
else(if not member ((x,y),outgoing_edges(x, c‘g1)) then L2
% checks if needed edge has right needed else go ...
obtain edge with correct right
else (if member(r,(c‘db(x,y))) then LFALSE else L2 endif)
endif) endif) endif],
%Part 4.3: % checks if there are at least 3 verts in graph else ...
quit
L2: c with [PC:= if (card[Vertex ](vert(c‘g1))=3)
then L3
else LFALSE endif],
%Part 4.4: % initializes the vertices attributes
L3: L3(c, x, y) with [PC:= L4],
%Part 4.5:
L4: Take_out_edge ?(c, x, c‘Node) with [PC:=L5],
%Part 4.6: % updates X’s destination node ’s destination , sets the ...
right to add to edge
L5: L5(c, Y, r) with [PC:=L6],
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%Part 4.7: % adds edge to graph and adds right edge to database
L6: L6(c, x, y, r) with [PC:=L7],
%Part 4.8: % checks to see if right exists for added edge
L7: c with [PC:= if member(r,(c‘db(x,y))) then LTRUE else ...
LFALSE endif],
%Part 4.9:
LTRUE: LTRUE(c) with [PC:= LEND],
%Part 4.10:
LFALSE:LFALSE(c) with [PC:= LEND],
%Part 4.11:
LEND: c
Endcases
%Part 5:
takerule(num: nat , r: Rights , x: Vertex , y: Vertex , initial:
L_Graph ): Recursive L_Graph = if num =0 then
initial with [PC:=L0]
else
sw(takerule(num-1 ,r,x,y,initial),r,x,y)
endif measure num
%Part 6:
Take_Rule_Taken : THEOREM FORALL ( initial : L_Graph): FORALL(num:
nat | takerule(num , read , X, Z, initial)‘PC=LEND): takerule(num ,
read , X, Z, initial)‘taken=true
%Part 7:
END take_rule
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Part 2 states that this theory is going to use the tgDefinitions, Graph Init,
Node ops, and Add Edge theories.
Part 3 are the loop actions taken when for the PC functions are taken
Part 3.1 L0 initializes the graph g1 and the rights for the edge db.
Part 3.2 L3 calls set Node e1 function which will set the node attributes for
each vertex in the graph.
Part 3.3 Take out edge verifies if the take right is in the current selected edge,
if it is, then the source and destination node are updated for that vertex else the
L Graph is returned unchanged.
Part 3.4 L5 updates X’s destination node’s (Y) destination and source.
Part 3.5 L6 adds the new edge to the graph and the edge with right to the edge
database.
Part 3.6 LTRUE returns L Graph with taken set to true.
Part 3.7 LFALSE returns L Graph with taken set to false.
Part 4 is the recursive loop built into a case statement. The recursion moves
as the PC is changed through each iteration. The case statement is called sw which
takes a L Graph, and two vertices, and a right. The vertex that is going to take the
given right from the second vertex.
Part 4.1 L0 calls loop action L0 and sets PC to L1.
Part 4.2 L1 checks to make sure both vertices are in the digraph and that the
edge does not exist with the correct right. If it does exist then LFALSE if the edge
does not exist with correct right then L2.
Part 4.3 L2 checks to see if there are three vertices in the graph. If there are 3
vertices then the PC is set to L3 otherwise it is set to LFALSE.
Part 4.4 L3 calls the loop action L3 to initialize the vertices attributes.
Part 4.5 L4 loop action Take out edge is called and PC=L5.
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Part 4.6 L5 updates the node’s destination destination node, in this case Y and
then goes to L6.
Part 4.7 L6 adds the new edge to the graph then calls L7.
Part 4.8 L7 checks to make sure the edge created has the required right. If it
does, it goes to LTRUE else LFALSE.
The LTRUE PC counter in Part 4.9 goes to LEND. This indicates that taken
was indeed successful.
Part 4.10, the PC counter LFALSE goes to LEND. This indicates that taken
failed.
The PC counter LEND, Part 4.11, signals the end of the program counter and
returns a L Graph.
In Part 5, takerule is the recursive call to go through the program counter case
statements found in the sw function. If num = zero then the initial graph starts
with the PC = L0 else the case statement sw is called with takerule as one of the
parameters, which invokes the recursion.
Take Rule Taken in Part 6 is the theorem for Take, which says that for all
the initial L Graph, for all num (arbitrary number used for recursion), when the
PC=LEND taken = true.
3.3.3 Grant Rule. The grant rule theory is designed to return true or false
in List 3.18 if for the digraph specified Y grants read rights to Z to X.
List 3.18: Grant Rule
%Part 1: SUBJECT ONLY. is used for rule definition : 3 node query
grant_rule [ Vertex : TYPE +] : THEORY
BEGIN
%Part 2:
Importing tgDefinitions[Vertex]
Importing Grant_Graph_Init[Vertex]
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Importing Node_ops[Vertex]
Importing Add_Edge[Vertex]
%Part 3: %loop actions
%Part 3.1:
L0(c: L_Graph , x:Vertex , y:Vertex ): L_Graph = c with
[g1:=InitGraph , db:= ADD(c‘db)]
%Part 3.2:
L3(c: L_Graph , x: Vertex , y:Vertex ):L_Graph =
set_Node_e1(c, vert(c‘g1))
%Part 3.3:
%see if the current edge has grant for a right if it does update ...
the dest and source
Grant_in_edge ?(c: L_Graph , x: Vertex , n: n_db): L_Graph =
if member(take , c‘db(c‘Node(x)‘e1))
then c with [Node := Node_update(c‘Node , x, c‘Node(x)‘e1 ‘1, c‘...
Node(x)‘e1 ‘2)]
else c endif
%Part 3.4:
L5(c: L_Graph , x: Vertex , r:Rights):L_Graph = c with [Node:=
Node_update(c‘Node , x, c‘Node(x)‘e1 ‘1, c‘Node(x)‘e1 ‘2) , addright :=
r]
%Part 3.5: % adds new edge to graph , adds new edge right to ...
right_db
L6(c: L_Graph , x: Vertex , y: Vertex , r: Rights):L_Graph = c with
[ g1:= AddEdge(c‘g1 , x, y),
db:= AddEdgeRight(c‘db , x, y, r)]
%Part 3.6:
LTRUE(c:L_Graph): L_Graph = c with [ granted := true]
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%Part 3.7:
LFALSE(c:L_Graph): L_Graph = c with [ granted := false]
%Part 4: Loop
sw(c: L_Graph , r: Rights , x: Vertex , y: Vertex ): L_Graph =
Cases c‘PC of
%Part 4.1: %initializes graph and E_DB
L0:L0(c,x,y) with [PC:=L1],
%Part 4.2: % checks if first node is in graph else quit
L1: c with [PC:= if not member(x, vert(c‘g1)) then LFALSE
% checks if second node is in graph else quit
else (if not member(y, vert(c‘g1)) then LFALSE
% checks if needed edge exists else obtain new edge
else(if not member ((x,y),outgoing_edges(x, c‘g1)) then L2
% checks if correct right exists on edge
else (if member(r,(c‘db(x,y))) then LFALSE else L2 endif)
endif) endif) endif],
%Part 4.3: %checks there are at least 3 verts in graph else quit
L2: c with [PC:= if (card[Vertex ]( vert(c‘g1))=3)
then L3
else LFALSE endif],
%Part 4.4:
L3: L3(c, x, y) with [PC:= L4],
%Part 4.5:
L4: Grant_in_edge ?(c, x, c‘Node) with [PC:=L5],
%Part 4.6: updates X’s dest node ’s dest , sets the right to add to ...
edge
L5: L5(c, Y, r) with [PC:=L6],
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%Part 4.7: % adds edge to graph and adds right edge to database
L6: L6(c, x, y, r) with [PC:=L7],
%Part 4.8:
L7: c with [PC:= if member(r,(c‘db(x,y))) then LTRUE else ...
LFALSE endif],
%Part 4.9:
LTRUE : LTRUE(c) with [PC:= LEND],
%Part 4.10:
LFALSE:LFALSE(c) with [PC:= LEND],
%Part 4.11:
LEND: c
Endcases
%Part 5:
grantrule(num: nat , r: Rights , x: Vertex , y: Vertex , initial:
L_Graph ): Recursive L_Graph = if num =0 then
initial with [PC:=L0]
else
sw(grantrule(num-1 ,r,x,y,initial),r,x,y)
endif measure num
%Part 6:
Grant_Rule_Granted : THEOREM FORALL ( initial : L_Graph): FORALL(num:
nat | grantrule(num , read , X, Z, initial)‘PC=LEND): grantrule(num ,
read , X, Z, initial)‘granted=true
%Part 7:
END grant_rule
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Part 2 states that this theory uses the tgDefinitions, Grant Graph Init, Node ops,
and Add Edge theories.
Part 3 are the loop actions taken for the PC functions.
Part 3.1 L0 initializes the graph g1 and the rights for the edge db.
Part 3.2 L3 calls set Node e1 function which will set the node attributes for
each vertex in the graph.
Part 3.3 Grant in edge verifies the grant right is in the current selected edge.
If it is, then the source and destination nodes are updated for that vertex. Otherwise
the L Graph is returned unchanged.
Part 3.4 L5 updates the X’s destination node’s (Y) destination and source.
Part 3.5 L6 adds the new edge to the graph and the edge with right to the edge
database.
Part 3.6 LTRUE returns L Graph with taken set to true
Part 3.7 LFALSE returns L Graph with taken set to false
Part 4 The recursive loop is built into a case statement, the recursion moves
as the PC is changed through each iteration. The case statement is called sw which
takes a L Graph, and two vertices, and a right. The vertex that is going to take the
given right from the second vertex.
Part 4.1 L0 calls loop action L0 and sets PC to L1
Part 4.2 L1 checks to make sure both vertices are in the digraph and that the
edge does not exist with the correct right. If it does exist then PC is set to LFALSE
otherwise it is set with L2.
Part 4.3 L2 checks if there are three vertices in the graph, if there are then go
to L3 else quit by setting PC to LFALSE.
Part 4.4 L3 calls the loop action L3 to initialize the vertices attributes.
Part 4.5 L4 loop action Grant in edge is called and PC=L5.
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Part 4.6 L5 updates the node’s destination destination node, in this case Y and
then goes to L6.
Part 4.7 L6 adds the new edge to the graph then calls L7.
Part 4.8 L7 checks to make sure the edge created has the required right. If it
does, it goes to LTRUE theorem is successful otherwise theorem failed and PC goes
to LFALSE.
Part 4.9 LTRUE goes to LEND. This indicates that granted was indeed suc-
cessful.
Part 4.10 LFALSE goes to LEND. This indicates that granted failed.
Part 4.11 LEND is then end of the program counter and returns a L Graph.
Part 5 grantrule is the recursive call to go through the program counter case
statements found in the sw function. If num = zero then the initial graph starts
with the PC = L0 else the case statement sw is called with grantrule as one of the
parameters, which invokes the recursion.
Part 6 Grant Rule Granted is the theorem for Take, which says for all the
initial L Graph, for all some num (arbitrary number used for recursion) that when
the PC=LEND granted = true.
3.3.4 Create Rule. The CreateRule theory is specified in List 3.19 and
returns true or false if for the digraph specified, X can create vertex A and give the
new edge (X, A) all the rights written as create(X, A, allrights), where all rights are
read, write, take, and grant.
List 3.19: Create Rule
%Part 1:
create_rule [ Vertex : TYPE + ]: THEORY
%SUBJECT ONLY
BEGIN
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%Part 2:
Importing cDefinitions[Vertex]
Importing Add_Edge[Vertex]
Importing Graph_Init[Vertex]
%Part3 : loop actions
%Part3 .1:
L0(c: L_Graph): L_Graph = c with [g1:=InitGraph , db:= ADD(c‘db) ]
%Part 3.2: creates the new VERT for graph
CREATE_VERT(c: L_Graph , x: Vertex ,y:Vertex):L_Graph = c with
[g1:= AddVert(c‘g1 , y)]
%Part 3.3: creates the new edge for the new vert created.
CREATE_EDGE(c: L_Graph , x: Vertex , y: Vertex):L_Graph = c with [
g1:= AddEdge(c‘g1 , x, y),
db:= AddEdgeAllRights(c‘db , x, y)]
%Part 3.4:
LTRUE(c:L_Graph): L_Graph = c with [ created := true]
%Part 3.5:
LFALSE(c:L_Graph): L_Graph = c with [ created := false]
%Part 4: %Loop
sw(c: L_Graph , x: Vertex , y: Vertex): L_Graph =
Cases c‘PC of
%Part 4.1:
L0:L0(c) with [PC:=L1],
%Part 4.2: % checks if first node is in graph else quit
L1: c with [PC:=if not member(x, vert(g1(c)))
then LFALSE else L2 endif],
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%Part 4.3: %creates the new node
L2: CREATE_VERT(c,x,y) with [PC:=L3],
%Part 4.4:
L3: c with [PC:=if member(y, vert(g1(c))) then L4
else LFALSE endif],
%Part 4.5: %creates the new edge to the new node.
L4:CREATE_EDGE(c, x, y) with [PC:=L5],
%Part 4.6:
L5: c with [PC:= if member ((x,y),edges(g1(c))) then
LTRUE else LFALSE endif],
%Part 4.7:
LTRUE:LTRUE(c) with [ PC:= LEND],
%Part 4.8:
LFALSE:LFALSE(c) with [ PC:= LEND],
%Part 4.9:
LEND: c
Endcases
%Part 5:
can_create(num: nat , x: Vertex , y: Vertex , initial:
L_Graph ): Recursive L_Graph = if num =0 then
initial with [PC:=L0]
else
sw(can_create(num-1 ,x,y,initial),x,y)
endif measure num
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%Part 6:
Create : THEOREM FORALL ( initial : L_Graph):
FORALL(num: nat | can_create(num , X, A, initial)‘PC=LEND):
can_create(num , X, A, initial)‘created = true
%Part 7:
END create_rule
Part 2 states that this theory is going to use the cDefinitions, Graph Init, and
Add Edge theories.
Part 3 are the loop actions taken when for the PC functions.
Part 3.1 L0 initializes the graph g1 and also the rights for the edge db.
Part 3.2 CREATE V ERT returns L Graph with the new vertex added to g1.
Part 3.3 CREATE EDGE returns the L Graph with the new edge added to
g1 and the rights for the new edge added to the edge database.
Part 3.4 LTRUE returns L Graph with created set to true
Part 3.5 LFALSE returns L Graph with created set to false
Part 4 is the recursive loop built into a case statement. The recursion moves
as the PC is changed through each iteration. The case statement is called sw which
takes a L Graph, and two vertices. The vertex that is going to create the new vertex
and the new vertex to be created.
Part 4.1 L0 calls loop action L0 and sets PC to L1.
Part 4.2 L1 if the vert that is doing the creating is not a member of g1 then the
PC is set to LFALSE else it is set to L2.
Part 4.3 L2 loop action CREATE V ERT is called and PC is set to L3.
Part 4.4 L3 If the new vert has been added successfully then PC equals L4
otherwise PC is set to LFALSE because the vertex was not created.
Part 4.5 L4 loop action CREATE EDGE is called and PC equals L5.
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Part 4.6 L5 if the new edge has been successfully added then PC equals LTRUE
else set PC to LFALSE.
Part 4.7 LTRUE goes to LEND. This states that Create was indeed successful.
Part 4.8 LFALSE goes to LEND. This states that Create failed.
Part 4.9 LEND is then end of the program counter and returns a L Graph.
Part 5 can create is the recursive call to go through the program counter case
statements found in the sw function. If num = zero then the initial graph starts
with the PC = L0 else the case statement sw is called with can create as one of the
parameters, which invokes the recursion.
Part 6 Can Create is the theorem for Create, which says that for all the initial
L Graph, for all num (arbitrary number used for recursion), when the PC=LEND
created = true.
3.3.5 Remove Rule. In List 3.20 the RemoveRule theory returns true if, for
the digraph specified, the read right for edge (Y, Z) is removed. If there are no more
rights for that edge, the edge is also removed.
List 3.20: Remove Rule
%Part 1: SUBJECT ONLY
remove_rule [ Vertex : TYPE + ] : THEORY
BEGIN
%Part 2:
Importing rDefinitions[Vertex]
Importing Graph_Init[Vertex]
Importing RemoveEdge[Vertex]
%Part 3: loop actions
%Part 3.1:
L0(c: L_Graph): L_Graph = c with [g1:=InitGraph , db:= ADD(c‘db) ]
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%Part 3.2:
Remove_Right(c:L_Graph ,e:edgetype ,r:Rights): L_Graph=
%checks to see if the edge has any rights
if empty ?(c‘db(e))
%no rights delete edge
Then Remove_Edge(c,e)
%has rights see if it has right we need
Else (if member(r,c‘db(e))
%has right now remove it
Then c with [db:= RemoveEdgeRight ((c‘db) , e, r) , removed :=true]
else c with [ removed :=false]
endif) endif
%Part 3.3:
LTRUE(c: L_Graph): L_Graph = c with [ removed := true]
%Part 3.4:
LFALSE(c: L_Graph): L_Graph = c with [ removed := false]
%Part 4: %Loop
sw(c: L_Graph , r: Rights , x: Vertex , y: Vertex): L_Graph =
Cases c‘PC of
%Part 4.1: %initializes graph and E_DB
L0:L0(c) with [PC:= L1],
%Part 4.2: % checks if first node is in graph else quit
L1: c with [PC:= if not member(x, vert(c‘g1))
then LFALSE
% checks if second node is in graph else quit
else (if not member(y, vert(c‘g1)) then LFALSE
% checks if needed edge exists else need to obtain...
edge
else L2 endif) endif],
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%Part 4.3: % checks if the edge even exists in graph.
L2: c with [PC:= if edge?(c‘g1)(x,y) then L3
else LFALSE endif],
%Part 4.4: %removes right or actual edge depending on graph.
L3: Remove_Right(c, (x,y),r) with [PC:= L4],
%Part 4.5:
L4: c with [PC:=
if empty?(c‘db((x,y))) then L3
else LEND endif ],
%Part 4.6:
LTRUE : LTRUE(c) with [PC:= LEND],
%Part 4.7:
LFALSE : LFALSE(c) with [PC:= LEND],
%Part 4.8:
LEND: c
Endcases
%Part 5:
can_remove(num: nat , r: Rights , x: Vertex , y: Vertex ,
initial : L_Graph ): Recursive L_Graph = if num =0 then
initial with [PC:=L0]
else
sw(can_remove(num-1 ,r,x,y,initial),r,x,y)
endif measure num
%Part 6:
%(Remove , take , X, Y)
Can_Remove : THEOREM FORALL ( initial : L_Graph):
FORALL(num: nat | can_remove(num , take , X, Y, initial)‘PC=LEND):
can_remove(num , take , X, Y, initial)‘removed = true
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%Part 7:
END remove_rule
Part 2 states that this theory is going to use the cDefinitions, Graph Init, and
RemoveEdge theories.
Part 3 are the loop actions taken for the PC functions.
Part 3.1 L0 initializes the graph g1 and also the rights for the edge db.
Part 3.2 Remove Right returns a L Graph with possibly g1, db, and removed
changed. First it checks to see if the edge has any rights. If it does not, it calls
Remove Edge to delete the edge else it checks to see if the right to be deleted is a
part of the right to that edge. If the right exists then RemoveEdgeRight is called,
and the right is removed and removed equals true, else removed equals false.
Part 3.3 LTRUE returns L Graph with removed set to true.
Part 3.4 LFALSE returns L Graph with removed set to false.
Part 4 is the recursive loop built into a case statement. The recursion moves
as the PC is changed through each iteration. The case statement is called sw which
takes a L Graph, the right to be removed, and two vertices. The two vertices are used
to get the edge to delete the right from.
Part 4.1 L0 calls loop action L0 and sets PC to L1.
Part 4.2 L1 if both the vertices passed in as parameters exist as a member of
g1 then the PC is set to L2 otherwise it is set to LFALSE.
Part 4.3 L2 If the edge to delete the right from exists in g1 then PC equals L3,
if not then PC is set to LFALSE because the edge does not exist.
Part 4.4 L3 loop action Remove Right is called and PC equals L4.
Part 4.5 L4 if the edge that the right was removed from has no more rights then
PC equals L3 else PC equals LEND.
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Part 4.6 L5 if the new edge has been successfully added then PC=LTRUE else
LFALSE.
Part 4.7 LTRUE goes to LEND, which means Remove was indeed successful.
Part 4.8 LFALSE goes to LEND. This means Remove failed.
Part 4.9 LEND is the end of the program counter and returns a L Graph.
Part 5 can remove is the recursive call that goes through the program counter
case statements found in the sw function. If num = zero then the initial graph starts
with the PC = L0 else the case statement sw is called with can remove as one of the
parameters, which invokes the recursion.
Part 6 Can Remove is the theorem for Remove, which says that for all the
initial L Graph, for all num that when PC=LEND removed = true.
Figure 3.7: Example 1 of Can Share Graph G0
3.4 Can Share Algorithm
The Can Share is one of the four main predicates for the Take-Grant Model. It
formally defines the notion of transferring authority [Bis95]. Thus, it is important to
implement in PVS. The Can Share algorithm, List 3.21 uses Figure 3.7 as a reference
even though the algorithm is designed to operate with any number of vertices in the
digraph.
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List 3.21: Can Share Algorithm
Can_Share(read ,X,Z,graph)
*** Can have a t* or a t*g* path
L0: Initialize the graph and the rights for the edges . If X is not
in digraph then goto LFALSE Else if Z is not in graph then goto
LFALSE
Else if edge (X,Z) does not exist then goto L1
Else if edge(X,Z) contain the read right then goto LTRUE
Else goto L1
L1: if there is at least three vertices in the graph then goto L2
Else goto LFALSE
L2: if Z does nothave incoming edges then goto LFALSE else goto
L3
L3: if X does nothave any edges then goto LFALSE else goto L4
L4: if X has an edge that either has a take or a grant right
then save the other vertex that makes up that edge in a variable
into variable TWO and goto L5 Else goto LFALSE
L5: if an edge exists from TWO to Z with the read right
then goto L6
Else If an edge exists with a take right : save the corresponding
edge vertex into THREE and goto L8
else if an edge exists with a grant right : save the corresponding ...
edge vertex into THREE
goto L9 else goto L4
L6: Add edge(X,Z) with right read to digraph and edge database
goto L7
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L7: If edge(X,Z) exists in the graph with read right goto LTRUE
L8: add edge(X,THREE) with take right to digraph and edge database
goto L4
L9: add edge(X,THREE) with grant right to digraph and edge
database goto L4
LTRUE Can_Share(read ,X,Z,graph) is true
LFALSE - Can_Share(read ,X,Z,graph) is false
L0 initializes the graph and the edge database then checks to make sure the two
vertices to share rights exist in the digraph and that an edge does not already exist
between them with the correct right. If an edge already exists with the right wanted
then Can Share is true, otherwise it continues on with the algorithm.
L1 checks to make sure that there is at least three vertices in the digraph
otherwise the right cannot be shared and Can Share is false. If it is true go to L2.
L2 checks to see if Z has incoming edges. If Z has no incoming edges, there is
no way X can get shared read rights to it. Therefore, Can Share, is false. Otherwise
go to L3.
L3 checks to see if X has any edges. If it does, go to L4. Otherwise Can Share is
false. Even though Can Share uses a digraph for the take and grant rights direction
is not a concern because of the Take-Grant lemmas.
L4 find an edge leaving X that has either a take or a grant right. In our example
edge (X, Y) has a take so save vertex Y into variable TWO and goto L5. If there are
no edges, the Can Share is false.
L5 finds an edge that exists from the TWO variable to either Z with the correct
right and goes to L6. Or it looks for an edge with a take and goes to L8 or an edge
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with a grant and goes to L9. If there are no edges with the correct rights and go to
L4 to check if there are anymore edges from X.
L6 adds the edge (X, Z) with read right to the graph and edge database and
goto L7.
L7 double checks to make sure that the edge was successfully added to the
digraph then goes to LTRUE else LFALSE.
L8 and L9 are divided so the proper chain of witnesses can be established. For
an example, consider Figure 3.8 which shows Can Share from (X, Z), but only by
going through vertex A so L8 and L9 are for this situation.
Figure 3.8: Example 2 Can Share Graph G0
L8 adds edge(X,THREE) with a take right to the digraph and edge database.
Goto L4 to continue trying to share read rights to Z to X.
L9 adds edge(X,THREE) with a grant right to the digraph and edge database.
Goto L4 to continue trying to share read rights to Z to X.
LTRUE means that Can Share is true therefore an edge from (X,Z) with read
right can be added or X can obtain the read right.
LFALSE means that Can Share is false and an edge from (X,Z) with read right
can NOT be added.
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This algorithm operates on the assumption that no matter how many vertices
are in the digraph, only three are examined at a time: hence the variable TWO and
THREE keep track of where the algorithm is in the digraph.
3.5 Contributions to PVS Digraph Library
The Labeled digraph theory is an extension of the digraph theory. Labeled digraph
allows labels to be assigned directly to the edge and keeps them together like a record.
There is really only two differences between digraph and labeled digraph: digraph has
only one parameter of type T and labeled digraph has two parameters T and U, where
U is assumed to be an enumerated type.
Figure 3.9: Partial Digraph Theory.
In digraph, the edgetype is made up of a pair of T. In a labeled digraph edgetype
is a record made up of two fields: edge, which is a pair of T and label, which is a
finite set of U. Pairs and Finite Sets are functions in existing PVS theories: pair
and finite set. All regular digraph functions and lemmas become labeled digraph
functions. In Figure 3.9 and Figure 3.10 selected definitions and functions are shown
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to highlight the difference between digraph theory and labelled digraph. For both
figures, corresponding numbers are used in the discussion. Line 1 shows the difference
in how edgetype is defined. In digraph it is a simple pair, and in labeled digraph it is
a record holding two fields: edge and label. For both figures lines 2, 4, and 6 involve
only a name change. For lines 3, 5, 7, 8, 9 the difference in the theories is in digraph
edge is used, however in labelled digraph e′edge is used. Because labelled digraph
declares edgetype as a record, access to edge has to be done by using the field name.
Lines 3 and 7 are different in labeled digraphs because of record accession. To
access the edge, first an edgetype has to be accessed, then the individual field has to
be accessed, which is done through ′1 or ′2. For example e′edge′1 accesses the first
field of edge which is a field in edgetype.
Figure 3.10: Partial Labelled Digraph Theory
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This contribution, which was to incorporate labels into the digraph structure,
was submitted to NASA Langley for inclusion in their PVS libraries, however it was
not used for the thesis because it was developed late in the effort and the structure
for the Take-Grant was already firmly established.
3.6 Summary
The two specification models are described. Chapter 4 explains the proof of the
theorems. Since the Can Share algorithm was discussed in this chapter, the actual
code will be discussed in the next.
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IV. Proving the Take-Grant Model in PVS
4.1 Introduction
PVS has an integrated proof checker to verify specifications. “The primary
emphasis in the PVS proof checker is on supporting the construction of readable
proofs [SORSC99].” As such, much attention was given to simplifying the process of
developing, debugging, maintaining, and presenting proofs. To assist in developing
proofs, powerful proof commands carry out propositional, equality, and arithmetic
reasoning. Due to the integration between the typechecker and the proof checker,
PVS supports an expressive specification language, while also providing a powerful
theorem proving capability [SORSC99]. “The PVS typechecker analyzes theories for
semantic consistency and adds semantic information to the internal representation
built by the parser [OSRSC99b].”
Theorem proving may be required to establish the type-consistency of a PVS
specification, therefore the typechecker uses the deductive power of the proof checker
to discharge any proof obligations, termed type correctness conditions (TCCs), gen-
erated. TCCs may arise when a term is typechecked against an expected predicate
subtype or as subgoals during proof checking, when the typechecker is invoked to
check user-supplied expressions and quantifier instantiations [SORSC99]. The TCCs
do not have to be proved immediately, but until they are proved, the theory that
generated them is not considered to be typechecked and any theorems proved are
considered to be “proved-incomplete” [OSRSC99b]. The proof representation and
PVS prover commands are discussed in the following subsections.
4.1.1 PVS Proof Representation. PVS proofs follow standard proof theory
when displayed on the screen. The following overview of the proof representation is
taken from the PVS Prover Guide [SORSC99]1 :
PVS has a sequent-style proof representation, which allows the effects
of the prover commands to be understood. A proof tree is maintained,
1For a more indepth understanding of the prover reference PVS Prover Guide, [SORSC99]
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with the goal being that a proof tree is constructed with all the leaves being
true, thus it is “complete”. Each leave/node is a proof goal in the proof
tree from which, by means of a proof step, spring its children. Each proof
goal is a sequent consisting of a sequence of formulas called antecedents
and a sequence of formulas called consequents.
In PVS, such a sequent is displayed in List 4.1 where the Ai and Bj
are PVS formulas collectively referred to as sequent formulas: the Ai are
the antecedents and the Bj are the consequents; the row of dashes serves
to separate the antecedents from the consequents. In text sequents are
written: A1, A2, A3, ... ` B1, B2, B3...
List 4.1: PVS Sequent Example [SORSC99]
{-1] A1
{-2} A2
[-3] A3
.
.
.
----------------
{1] B1
[2] B2
{3} B3
.
.
.
The sequence of antecedents or consequents (but not both) may be
empty. The intuitive interpretation of a sequent is that the conjunc-
tion of the antecedents implies the disjunction of the consequents, i.e.,
(A1
∧
A2
∧
A3...) ⊃ (B1 ∨ B2 ∨ B3...). The proof tree starts with a root
node of the form ` A, where A is the theorem to be proved. PVS proof
steps build a proof tree by adding subtrees to leaf nodes as directed by the
proof commands. A sequent is true if any antecedent is the same as any
consequent, if any antecedent is false, or if any consequent is true. Other
sequents can also be recognized as true, using more powerful inferences
that will be described later. Once a sequent is recognized as true, that
branch of the proof tree is terminated. The goal is to build a proof tree
whose branches have all been terminated in this way.
Attention is always focused on some sequent that is a leaf node in
the current proof tree–this sequent is displayed by the PVS prover while
awaiting the user’s command. The numbers in brackets, e.g., [-3], and
braces, e.g., 3, before each formula in the displayed sequent are used to
name the corresponding formulas. The formula numbers in square brackets
indicate formulas that are unchanged in a subgoal from the parent goal
whereas the numbers in braces serve to highlight those formulas that are
either new or different from those of the parent sequent.
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The proof structure makes it easy for the user to understand the effects the
proof command described in the next section have on the proof.
4.1.2 PVS Commands. The commands used to prove the two specifications
are grind, skosimp, induct, lemma, and expand. Their definitions are described
below.
The grind strategy has the syntax “(grind)” which rewrites formulas and re-
peatedly simplifies them. “This is a catch-all strategy that is frequently used to
automatically complete a proof branch or to apply the obvious simplifications till
they no longer apply [SORSC99].” Grind is the short command that applies in
order: install − rewrites, bddsimp, assert, replace∗, and reduce. The command
install − rewrites installs given theories and rewrite rules along with all the rele-
vant definitions in the given subgoal. Bddsimp, which stands for binary decision
diagram simplification, applies propositional simplification and assert simplifies us-
ing the decision procedures to carry out the first level of simplification [SORSC99].
The replace∗ command carries out all the equality replacements, and the ∗ means the
command will be iteratively applied. The command reduce is the “main workhorse”
of the grind command and repeatedly simplifies through the application of the bash
and replace∗ command [SORSC99]. The bash command is another shortcut com-
mand executing in order assert, bddsimp, inst?, skolem − typepred, flatten, and
lift− if commands [SORSC99]. The command inst? instantiates existential strength
quantifiers, while skolem− typepred skolemizes with type constraints, and lift− if
rule lifts the left-innermost contiguous IF or CASES branching structure to the top
level [SORSC99].
Skosimp command which has the syntax (skosimp) is the short version of
(skolem)(flatten). Skolem replaces universal quantifiers with constants and flatten
performs disjunctive simplification [SORSC99].
The induct command syntax is (induct var), which automatically applies an
induction scheme. The variable name var must be quantified at the outermost level
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of the consequent formula. As long as the bound variable is of a type, such as nat,
the induction scheme is selected automatically. Most induction schemes are found in
the PVS prelude library [OS03].
The lemma command, (lemma name), incorporates lemma name in to the
proof. Additional subgoals may be generated with the addition of the lemma rule
[SORSC99].
The expand command syntax: (expand name) expands and simplifies all
instances of the name [SORSC99].
This remaining sections explain how to prove the TCCs, the theorems for both
specifications, as well as discusses the Can Share algorithm.
Figure 4.1: RemoveEdge TCC1
4.2 Proving the Type Correctness Conditions
Even though two separate specifications were developed, the common imported
theories used in each were very similar, therefore both have the same TCCs to be
proved.
The theory RemoveEdge produces the RemoveEdge TCC1 proof obligation,
Figure 4.1, which states that for all g1 digraphs and e 1 edgetypes, if the remove
function removes e from g1’s edges set then both of the vertices are in the graph.
This TCC is easily discharged with the grind command. Figure 4.2 shows what the
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Figure 4.2: RemoveEdge TCC1 Proof
RemoveEdge TCC1 looks like in PVS prover. At the prompt “Rule?” the (grind) is
entered which proves the TCC ending in Q.E.D..
The Add Edge theory produces the proof obligation Add Edge TCC1 of Figure
4.3, and of AddVert TCC1, Figure 4.4. The AddEdge TCC states that given two dis-
tinct vertices in the graph, any edges added to the graph is connecting vertices already
in the graph. This TCC is proved through an application of the grind command.
Figure 4.3: AddEdge TCC1
Figure 4.4, the AddVert TCC, states that if a vertex is not already in the graph,
then when it is added there is an edge that connects the vertex to itself. The grind
command also discharges this TCC.
The Graph Init and Grant Graph Init both produce the InitGraph TCC1 be-
cause the initialization function is called InitGraph. However for each theory the TCC
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Figure 4.4: AddVert TCC1
has to be solved because the function is different, due to edge order. The same goes
for TG Lemma Init Take and TG Lemma Init Grant and the InitGraphL TCC1.
In Figure 4.5 the obligation states it must be proven that for any edge added to
the graph, each vertex is added first to e′1 and then added to e′2 so they show up in
both pairs. Applying the grind command discharges this TCC .
Figure 4.5: InitGraph TCC1
There are ten TCCs which are particular to the second specification two each
from Node ops, take, grant, CREATE and the Remove theory. Node ops produces
two TCCs for set Node e1 TCC1, Figure 4.6, and set Node e1 TCC1, Figure 4.7.
Figure 4.6, the first TCC, is to establish that v is a finite set. If it is not empty
then it is non-empty and therefore has values in it. This can be discharged by applying
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Figure 4.6: set Node e1 TCC1
the grind command. The second TCC, Figure 4.7, validates that the not empty finite
set v implies a value can be chosen out of the set and this decreases the cardinality
of the set. This TCC is discharged through the prover commands (grind)(rewrite
“card remove”)(assert).
Figure 4.7: set Node e1 TCC2
Each of the main rules produce two TCC’s for their theorems. The take rule pro-
duces takerule TCC1 and takerule TCC2; grant rule produces grantrule TCC1 and
grantrule TCC1; CREATE produces can create TCC1 and can create TCC2, while
Remove produces can remove TCC1 and can remove TCC2. However, the only dif-
ference between the TCC1s are the name, likewise with TCC2s. These TCCs establish
that the recursion stops. In Figure 4.8 the obligation is to prove that for all num’s,
num is not equal to zero implies that num minus 1 will be greater than or equal to
zero.
Figure 4.8: takerule TCC1
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The second TCC in Figure 4.9 is to prove that all num’s are not equal to zero
and num minus one is less than num. Both of these TCCs are discharged with the
grind command.
Figure 4.9: takerule TCC2
After all the TCCs are proved then each theorem can be “proved-complete”
once it itself proves.
Figure 4.10: Take and Grant Rule Theorems
4.3 Take-Grant Model One - No Error Checking - Proofs
The Model one specification does not incorporate automatic error checking. The
theorems are straightforward and require knowledge of graph for the manual input
and decision making.
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Both of the theorems in TakeRule, along with the GrantRule, Figure 4.10, use
the commands (grind) and (lemma “not eq ax”). Depending on the order of the
commands either (grind)(lemma “not eq ax”)(grind) or (lemma“not eq ax′′)(grind)
will work. The former was first used, because it was not apparent immediately the
vertices would need to be proved not equal. In the first case (assert) can also be
substitute for the last grind. The lemma command can be invoked first, then the
grind command which takes slightly less time.
The two theorems in CreateRule and the one in RemoveRule, Figure 4.11, only
use the (grind) rule. CreateRule would have used the lemma rule however A is
declared in CreateRules functions to not be equal to the other vertices.
Figure 4.11: Create and Remove Theorems
4.4 Take-Grant Model Two - Error Checking - Proofs
This specification incorporates automatic error checking. The theorems use
recursion to facilitate the error checking thus no prior knowledge of the graph is
needed to test the theorems. However, problems were found in the Take and Grant
rules, when attempting to use a variable to specify a value for a function. Either
the variables caused a non-terminating recursion or the right proof commands could
not be determined. Because the Take and Grant rule should only be run on a 3
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vertex graph, which is how the basic rules are defined, hard coding the vertices is
not a problem if the X,Y,Z graph never changes. The Create and Remove rules are
straightforward and do not need prior knowledge of the graph to run. The theorems
listed in Figure 4.12 are similar except for the variable used to prove true.
Figure 4.12: Take, Grant, Create and Remove Theorems
Because all the theorems are similar only the Take rule will be examined. In
List 4.2 the execution of the Take rule in PVS is shown. Because certain commands
produce the same results the intervening steps have been deleted to simplify the
example.
List 4.2: Execution of the Take Rule in PVS: Take Rule Taken: Step 1
Take_Rule_Taken :
|-------
{1} FORALL ( initial : L_Graph):
FORALL (num: nat | takerule(num , read , X, Z, initial)‘PC...
= LEND):
takerule(num , read , X, Z, initial)‘taken = TRUE
Rule ? ( skosimp)
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In the List 4.2 shows what the Take rule looks like right after the prover is in-
voked. The first command to run is (skosimp) which replaces the universal quantifier
FORALL (initial:L Graph). The result of the command is in List 4.3.
List 4.3: Execution Take Rule Taken: Step 2
Take_Rule_Taken :
|-------
{1} FORALL (num: nat | takerule(num , read , X, Z, initial !1)‘PC =
LEND): takerule(num , read , X, Z, initial !1)‘taken
Rule ? ( induct ‘‘num ’’)
The expression in List 4.3, is of the form (FORALL (P:pred[t]): induction sub-
goal implies goal), where p is to be instantiated by the induction predicate [SORSC99].
The command run is (induct “num”). Because num is a natural number the induc-
tion scheme is employed automatically. Employing (induct) simplifies the formula to
a base case and induction subcases. Therefore, three subgoals result.
List 4.4: Execution Take Rule Taken.1
Take_Rule_Taken .1 :
|-------
{1} takerule(num!1, read , X, Z, initial !1)‘PC = LEND {2}
takerule(num!1, read , X, Z, initial !1)‘taken
Rule ? ( grind)
This completes the proof of Take_Rule_Taken .1.
The first subgoal, Take Rule Taken.1, is in List 4.4. The subgoal numbers are
added after the theorem name. Because there is only a single consequent for this
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subgoal which only requires definition expansion, grind is a good command to choose.
Grind rewrites and simplifies the subgoal and proves the subgoal in this case.
The next subgoal, Take Rule Taken.2, is also proved using grind. Take Rule Taken.3
is another induction. After using (induct “j”) two subgoals are generated. The first
subgoal Take Rule Taken.3.1 is solved through grind. The second subgoal Take Rule Taken.3.2
produces 5 subgoals after “grinding”.
List 4.5: Execution Take Rule Taken.3.2.1
Take_Rule_Taken .3.2.1 :
{-1} j!1 >= 0
{-2} L1?( takerule(j!1, read , X, Z, initial !1)‘PC)
{-3} edges(takerule(j!1, read , X, Z, initial !1)‘g1)(X, Z)
{-4} takerule(j!1, read , X, Z, initial !1)‘db(X, Z)(read)
|-------
Rule ? ( expand ‘‘takerule ’’ )
The first subgoal, Take Rule Taken.3.2.1, List 4.5 above, only has antecedents.
By applying the rule (expand “takerule”) the definition of takerule is expanded allow-
ing the resulting expressions to be simplified using decision procedures and rewrit-
ing [SORSC99]. The resulting expression can be simplified through a grind command,
which results in the List 4.6.
List 4.6: Execution Take Rule Taken.3.2.1
Take_Rule_Taken .3.2.1 :
[-1] j!1 >= 0
{-2} L0?( takerule(j!1 - 1 , read , X, Z, initial !1)‘PC)
{-3} Y = X
{-4} add(read , emptyset[Rights[Vertex ]])(read)
|-------
{1} j!1 = 0
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In Take Rule Taken.3.2.1 antecedent {-3} is Y = X. However in the definitions
file the axiom not eq ax states that none of the vertices are equal to each other
thus Y ! = X. To use that axiom in the proof it must be invoked which is done
through (lemma “not eq ax”) command. Thus the expression in List 4.7 becomes
trivial because of the contradiction of {−1} and [−4]. The axiom still needs to be
asserted. The (assert) command moves the antecedent {−1} down to a consequent
of the form Y = X and Z = Y and X = Z. Because Y = X and Y = X are
in both the antecedent and the consequent, it is true, which completes the proof
Take Rule Taken.3.2.1.
List 4.7: Execution Take Rule Taken.3.2.1
Take_Rule_Taken .3.2.1 :
{-1} X /= Y AND Y /= Z AND Z /= X
[-2] j!1 >= 0
[-3] L0?( takerule(j!1 - 1 , read , X, Z, initial !1)‘PC)
[-4] Y = X
[-5] add(read , emptyset[Rights[Vertex ]])(read)
|-------
[1] j!1 = 0
Rule ? ( assert)
This completes the proof of Take_Rule_Taken .3.2.1.
Through the application (grind), (expand“takerule”), (lemma “not eq ax”), and
(assert) the rest of the takerule theorem is proved. The entire proof is proved when
“Q.E.D.” is reached.
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Figure 4.13 shows the complete proof schema of takerule.
Figure 4.13: Take Picture Proof
All the rules use (skosimp), (induct “num”), (induct “j”), (grind), (expand
“theorem name”), (lemma “not eq ax”), and (assert).
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The application of the rules in the same order will prove the Grant rule as shown
in Figure 4.14.
Figure 4.14: Grant Picture Proof
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The Create rule, however, requires a different order of the commands applied.
Because there are fewer case statements, there are fewer subgoals. The Create rule is
shown in Figure 4.15.
Figure 4.15: Create Picture Proof
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The Remove rule also has a different number of subgoals, as Figure 4.16 shows.
Figure 4.16: Remove Picture Proof
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4.5 Can Share Algorithm
The Can Share algorithm is very involved and difficult to implement in PVS.
It follows the same form as the Model 2 specifications. It uses recursion to move
through the case statements which in turn call functions to manipulate the graph
or to error check the algorithm. Ideally, no prior knowledge of the graph would be
needed when the theorems are tested. After the graph is instantiated, it should not
have to remembered it to get the theorems to run correctly, which is why there is error
checking. For both the Take and Grant rule, three vertices and two edges are involved.
This is the basis of the Can Share algorithm and code, which was designed for a 3+
vertex graph. It finds the first three vertices and edges that correctly implement
the rule then connect the outer two vertices with an edge. If there are more than 3
vertices, it will start over again. This way the problem is always working off a three
node system. For simplicity, the current nodes are saved into variables labelled one,
two, and three. In the following two subsections the imported theories are discussed
then the Can Share code.
4.5.1 Theories Imported for Can Share. Can Share uses two theories,
Add Edge (List 3.2) and Graph Init (List 3.3), which are discussed above. The only
difference is the definition file is changed to csDefinitions for Can Share.
csDefinitions Theory
Except for additions to Parts 8 and 11 and the addition of a new Part 9, this
theory as shown in List 4.8 is similar to the Model 2 definitions file.
List 4.8: csDefinitions Theory
%Part 1:
csDefinitions [ Vertex : Type + ]: THEORY
BEGIN
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%Part 2:
Importing digraphs@digraphs[Vertex]
Importing digraphs@digraph_ops[Vertex]
Importing digraphs@digraph_deg[Vertex]
%Part 3: % declares TYPE of right works
Rights : TYPE = {read , write , take , grant } right : TYPE =
setof[Rights ] containing emptyset[Rights]
%Part 4:
E_DB: TYPE = function[edgetype[Vertex]->set[Rights ]]
%Part 5:
X,Y,Z,A,B: Vertex
%Part 6:
nil: Vertex
%Part 7:
PCT: TYPE =
{L00 ,L0,L1,L2,L3,L4,L5,L6,L7,L8,L9,L9t ,L9g ,L10 ,L11 ,L12 ,L13 ,L14 ,L15...
,L16 ,LTRUE ,LFALSE ,TG_EDGE ,LEND}
%Part 8
node : TYPE = [#
dest: Vertex ,
source : Vertex ,
e1: edgetype , % outgoing selected edge
ie: finite_set[edgetype ], % all incoming edges
e2:edgetype , % incoming selected edge
ie1: finite_set[edgetype ], % contains incoming edges ...
not visited
oe: finite_set[edgetype ], % all outgoing edges
oe1: finite_set[edgetype ], % edges modified
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oe2: finite_set[edgetype ], % contains outgoing edges ...
not visited
oec: nat , % outgoing edge card
iec:nat , % incoming edge card
ine1:finite_set[edgetype],
ine2:finite_set[edgetype],
e3:edgetype , % incident selected edge
inec:nat % incident edge card
#]
%Part 9
n_db: TYPE = function[Vertex -> node]
%Part 10:
found:type = {yes , no , un}
%Part 11:
L_Graph : TYPE = [#
g0: digraph[Vertex],
g1: digraph[Vertex],
db: E_DB ,
PC: PCT ,
Node: n_db ,
verts: set[Vertex],
shared : bool ,
FOUND:set[found],
one: Vertex ,
two: Vertex ,
three: Vertex ,
addright : Rights ,
good_nodes : set[Vertex]
#]
%Part 12:
null: edgetype = (nil ,nil)
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%Part 13:
not_eq_ax : AXIOM X/=Y and Y/=Z and Z/=X and X/=A and A/=Y and A/=Z
%Part 14:
END csDefinitions
In Part 8, type node has more attributes outgoing edges oe, oe1, oe2, incoming
edges ie, ie1, and incident edges ine1, ine2. Additionally nodes have attributes for a
selected outgoing edge, e1; incoming edge, e2; and incident edge, e3. There is also
a variable to track the cardinality of each edge set oec, iec, inec. The need for these
multiple variables for edge sets will be explained with the following cNode ops theory.
Part 9 declares a type found.
Part 11 declares a few more state variables: g0 is another digraph, verts is
a set of vertices, shared returns true or false depending on if the right can be
shared, FOUND is a set of found, and the variables one, two, three are vertex, and
good nodes is a set of vertices.
cNode ops Theory
This theory, List 4.9 declares all the operations on the node state.
List 4.9: cNode ops Theory
%Part 1:
csNode_ops [ Vertex : TYPE +]: THEORY
BEGIN
%Part 2:
Importing csDefinitions[Vertex]
%Part 3: %initialize node
Node_ops(Node: n_db , c: L_Graph , x: Vertex , oes:
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finite_set[edgetype], flag:bool , ae:edgetype):n_db = Node with
[(x):=(#
%outgoing edges
%takes all edges
oe:= if nonempty ?(oes) then oes else emptyset[edgetype]endif ,
%this should add together the difference of oe(all ...
outgoing edges ( incase one is added) , and oe1
% edges(that might be modified) with oe2 which does not ...
contain the edges already visited.
oe1 := if nonempty ?(oes) then union(difference(Node(x)‘oe,
Node(x)‘oe1),Node(x)‘oe2)else emptyset[edgetype]endif ,
e1:= if flag then ae else (if nonempty ?(Node(x)‘oe1) then
choose(Node(x)‘oe1) else null endif) endif ,
%removes edge that is visited are going to
oe2 := if ( member(Node(x)‘e1,Node(x)‘oe1)) and
nonempty ?(Node(x)‘oe1) then remove(Node(x)‘e1,Node(x)‘oe1)...
else
Node(x)‘oe1 endif ,
oec := card(Node(x)‘oe2),
%incoming edges
ie:= incoming_edges(x,c‘g1),
e2:= if nonempty ?(Node(x)‘ie) then choose(Node(x)‘ie) else null ...
endif , % edge
ie1 := if ( member(Node(x)‘e2,Node(x)‘ie)) and
nonempty ?(Node(x)‘ie) then remove(Node(x)‘e2,Node(x)‘ie) else
Node(x)‘ie endif , iec:=card(Node(x)‘ie1),
%incident edges
ine1 := if nonempty ?( incident_edges(x,c‘g1)) then
incident_edges(x,c‘g1) else emptyset[edgetype ] endif ,
e3:= if nonempty ?(Node(x)‘ine1) then choose(Node(x)‘ine1) else ...
null endif , % edge
ine2 := if ( member(Node(x)‘e3,Node(x)‘ine1)) and
nonempty ?(Node(x)‘ine1) then remove(Node(x)‘e3,Node(x)‘ine1) ...
else Node(x)‘e3 endif ,
inec := card(Node(x)‘ine2),
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%other
source := x,
dest := if Node(x)‘e1=null then nil else Node(x)‘e1 ‘2 endif
#)]
%Part 4: %update node dest and source
Node_update(Node: n_db , x: Vertex , e1: Vertex , e2: Vertex):n_db =
Node with [(x)‘dest := e2 ,(x)‘source := e1 , (x)‘num :=0]
%Part 5: %update incident edges for node
Node_INE_update(Node: n_db , c: L_Graph , x: Vertex , ines:
finite_set[edgetype ]):n_db = Node
with [(x)‘e3:= if nonempty ?(Node(x)‘ine1) then choose(Node(x)‘...
ine1) else null endif ,
(x)‘ine2 := if ( member(Node(x)‘e3,Node(x)‘ine1)) and nonempty...
?(Node(x)‘ine1)
then remove(Node(x)‘e3 ,Node(x)‘ine1)else Node(x)‘ine1 ...
endif ]
%Part 6: %initializes all nodes
set_Node(c: L_Graph , v: finite_set[Vertex], n: n_db): recursive
L_Graph =
if empty ?(v)then c
else let a = choose(v) in set_Node(c, remove(a,v) , Node_ops(c‘...
Node ,c,a, outgoing_edges(a, c‘g1) , false , null))
endif measure card(v)
%Part 7: %finds the first node in all the edges that have the ...
required right to the last node
find_good_node(c: L_Graph , e:edgetype , r:Rights): L_Graph = if not
member(r,c‘db(e)) then c else ( if nonempty ?(c‘good_nodes) then c
with [ good_nodes := add(e‘1,c‘good_nodes)]
else c with [ good_nodes :=add(e‘1,emptyset[Vertex ])]
endif) endif
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% send in the node to connect to with what right to get
% it will find all the incoming edges that has that right
%Part 8: %finds last edge
Find_last_edge(c: L_Graph , e: finite_set[edgetype], r:Rights):
recursive L_Graph =
if empty ?(e)then c
else let a = choose(e) in Find_last_edge(find_good_node(c, a, ...
r) , remove(a,e) , r)
endif measure card(e)
%Part 9:
END csNode_ops
In Part 3, the Node ops function is the main workhorse for the theory. This
function sets all the variables the first time out and is used during updates. The first
variable oe takes all the outgoing edges for the vertex or sets itself to empty if there
are none. Oe1 contains all the edges except for the ones already visited which allows
new edges to be added. Oe2 contains only the edges not visited. E1 contains the first
selected outgoing edge for the vertex. Oec is the cardinality of oe2. The incoming and
incidental edge variables are similar to the outgoing edges. Ie contains all incoming
edges. Ie1 is all the edges that haven’t been visited. E2 is the selected incoming edge
variable and iec is the cardinality of ie1. Ine1 contains all the incidental edges. Ine2
contains all the incidental edges not visited. E3 is the selected incidental edge. Inec
is the cardinality of ine2. Source is first set to the vertex itself then is set to the
vertex that called it. Dest is the destination node that is set first set to e1’s second
vertex.
Node update in Part 4 updates the source and the dest for the vertex.
In Part 5, Node INE update updates all the incidental edge variables.
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Part 6 set Node is the recursive call that originally sets each vertices’ attributes.
Part 7 the find good node function takes the edge sent to it and determines
if the needed right, in this example read, is in the edge database. If the right is,
good nodes is updated with the edges first vert (Y in this example). This will cycle
through all the edges getting all the vertices that are connected to the node to share
rights from. If the algorithm hits a good node the theorem will be correct.
In Part 8, Find last edge is a recursive function that goes through the last
node, in this example Z, incoming edges calling the function find good node to find
all the nodes that have edges connected to Z.
tgedge Theory
This theory in List 4.10 finds the tg edge for the first leg of the rule with
TG edge? then for the second leg of the rule with Find edge out?.
List 4.10: tgedge Theory
%Part 1:
tgedge [ Vertex : TYPE +] : THEORY
BEGIN
%Part 2:
Importing csDefinitions[Vertex]
Importing csNode_ops[Vertex]
%Part 3: %Don ’t care about Direction as long as T/G
TG_edge ?(c: L_Graph , x: Vertex): L_Graph = if
member(take ,c‘db(c‘Node(x)‘e3)) or
member(grant ,c‘db(c‘Node(x)‘e3))
% this should save x into the source node , and the start node ...
into dest. to use Find_edge
then c with [Node:= Node_update(c‘Node , x, c‘Node(x)‘e3 ‘2,
c‘Node(x)‘e3 ‘1) , FOUND:=add(yes , emptyset[found])]
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else(if c‘Node(x)‘inec =0
then c with [ FOUND:=add(no , emptyset[found])]
% go get another incoming edge
else c with [Node := Node_INE_update(c‘Node , c, x, ...
incident_edges(x, c‘g1)), FOUND:=add(un , emptyset[found])...
]
endif)endif
%Part 4: %finds edge for the second leg of the Take rule
Find_edge_out ?(c: L_Graph , x: Vertex): L_Graph =
If not c‘Node(x)‘oec = 0
then c with [ Node := Node_ops(c‘Node ,c,x,outgoing_edges(x,c‘g1...
), false , null)]
else c Endif
%Part 5
END tgedge
In Part 3 TG edge? finds an incidental edge that has a take or a grant right.
For the take or the grant, the direction of the edge does not matter, which is why the
incidental edge is used here. If the node is found, FOUND is set to “yes” and the
node source and destination variables get updated. If the edge is not found and the
cardinality of the edge set inec is not zero, then the FOUND variable is set to “un”,
if the cardinality is zero, the set is empty and FOUND is set to “no”.
Part 4 Find edge out? finds the next edge for the rule. Direction is important on
the second edge, because this edge might contain a read or a write. If the cardinality of
the outgoing edges is zero then L Graph is unchanged otherwise L Graph is returned
with the node updated through a call to node ops
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4.5.2 Can Share Code. The following code in List 4.11 is currently non-
proved, but typechecked. Can Share is discussed in slightly different manner than the
rules above because it is more involved.
List 4.11: Code for Can Share
Can_Share [ Vertex : TYPE +]: THEORY
%**** SUBJECT only CAN_SHARE ** can have a t* path or a t*g* path
BEGIN
Importing csDefinitions[Vertex ] % contains the definitions
Importing csInitialization[Vertex ] % initializes the graph
Importing csNode_ops[Vertex ] % contains operations on the nodes
Importing csAdd_Edge[Vertex ] % Adds the edges and edge rights
Importing tgedge[Vertex ] % finds edges
%loop actions
%sets: one ,
L00(c: L_Graph , x:Vertex , y:Vertex): L_Graph = c with [ g0:=
InitGraph ,g1:=InitGraph , db:= ADD(c‘db) , one:=x ]
%sets: the node information
L2(c: L_Graph , x: Vertex):L_Graph = set_Node(c, vert(c‘g1),
c‘Node)
L4(c: L_Graph , x: Vertex , r:Rights):L_Graph = Find_last_edge(c,
incoming_edges(x,c‘g1) , r)
%Finds the first edge from the beginning node with a t or g
TG_EDGE(c: L_Graph , x: Vertex , n: n_db):L_Graph = TG_edge ?(c, x)
%sets two
set_two(c:L_Graph , x: Vertex): L_Graph = c with [
two:=c‘Node(x)‘dest]
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L9(c: L_Graph , x: Vertex , r:Rights):L_Graph = c with [Node:=
Node_update(c‘Node , x, c‘Node(x)‘e1 ‘1, c‘Node(x)‘e1 ‘2),
addright :=r]
%sets: three
set_three(c:L_Graph , x: Vertex): L_Graph = c with [
three :=c‘Node(x)‘dest]
%adds new edge to graph , adds new edge right to edge_db , and ...
updates the node
L3(c: L_Graph , x: Vertex , y: Vertex , r: Rights):L_Graph = c with [
g1:= AddEdge(c‘g1 , x, y),
db:= AddEdgeRight(c‘db , x, y, r),
Node := Node_ops(c‘Node , c, x,outgoing_edges(x, c‘g1) , true , (x...
,y))]
%finds edge from second node
L14(c: L_Graph , x: Vertex , n: n_db): L_Graph = Find_edge_out ?(c, x)
LTRUE(c:L_Graph): L_Graph = c with [ shared := true]
LFALSE(c:L_Graph): L_Graph = c with [ shared := false]
%----------------------------------------------------------
%Part 3:% Switch Loop
sw(c: L_Graph , r: Rights , x: Vertex , y: Vertex): L_Graph =
Cases c‘PC of
%Part 3.1: % initializes graph and E_DB
L00: L00(c,x,y) with [PC:=L0],
%Part 3.2: % checks if first node is in graph else quit
L0:c with [PC:= if not member(x, vert(g1(c))) then LFALSE
% checks if second node is in graph else quit
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else (if not member(y, vert(g1(c))) then LFALSE
% checks if needed edge exists else need to obtain ...
edge
else(if not member ((x,y),outgoing_edges(x, c‘g1)) then L1
% checks if edge exists it has right needed else need ...
to obtainedge with correct right
else (if member(r,(c‘db(x,y))) then LTRUE else L1 endif)
endif) endif) endif],
%Part 3.3: % checks if there are at least 3 verts in graph else ...
quit
L1: c with [PC:= if card[Vertex ](vert(g1(c))) >=3
then L2 %yes
else LFALSE endif ], %no
%Part 3.4: % initializes the nodes and sees if there is edges going...
into end node
L2: L2(c, x) with [PC:=L3],
%Part 3.5: % checks to see if the node to share rights to has an ...
incoming edge
L3: c with [PC:=if c‘Node(y)‘iec =0 then LFALSE
else L4 endif ],
%Part 3.6: % goes and find all the edges going to the last node ...
with the needed right
L4: L4(c, x, r) with [PC:= TG_EDGE],
%Part 3.7: % goes to find an edge with TG
TG_EDGE:TG_EDGE(c, c‘one , c‘Node) with [PC:=L5],
%Part 3.8:
L5: set_two(c, x) with [PC:=L6],
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%Part 3.9:
L6: c with [PC:=
%haven ’t found an edge and more edges
if member(un,c‘FOUND) then TG_EDGE
%if not found and no more edges LFALSE else continue
else (if member(no,c‘FOUND) then LFALSE else L7 endif) ...
endif],
%Part 3.10: % checks if destination node has edges , then if the ...
destination node edge contains
%the node needed , then if right needed is there
L7: c with [PC:=
%does the dest node have incidental edges
if nonempty ?(c‘Node(c‘two)‘ine2)
then L8
else TG_EDGE
endif],
% is the node needed selected , then checks to see if it is the ...
correct right for that edge
%Part 3.11:
L8: c with [PC:=
%checks to see if we get the node we need in X’s ...
destination nodes current edge selected
if not member(c‘Node(c‘two)‘e3 ‘2, c‘good_nodes)
%no
then L10
%yes: now does the dest node edge contain the right needed
else (if ( member(r, c‘db(c‘Node(c‘two)‘e3)))
%yes
then L9
%no
else L10 endif)endif],
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%Part 3.12: % updates X’s destination node ’s destination , sets the ...
right to add to edge
L9: L9(c, c‘two , r) with [PC:=L12],
%Part 3.13: % adds a take to edge
L9t: L9(c, c‘two , take) with [PC:=L12],
%Part 3.14: % adds a grant to edge
L9g: L9(c, c‘two , grant) with [PC:=L12],
%Part 3.15: % Checks if take is in the new edge set of rights
L10: c with [PC:=
if ( member(take , c‘db(c‘Node(c‘two)‘e3)))
%yes
then L9t
%no
else L11 endif],
%Part 3.16: %if grant is in the edge
L11: c with [PC:=
if ( member(grant , c‘db(c‘Node(c‘two)‘e3)))
%yes
then L9g
%no
else L14 endif],
%Part 3.17:
L12: set_three(c, c‘two) with [PC:=L13],
%Part 3.18: % adds edge to graph and adds right edge to database
L13: L13(c, c‘one , c‘three , c‘addright) with [PC:=L16],
%goes to find another edge for second leg of take rule
%Part 3.19:
L14: L14(c, c‘two , c‘Node) with [PC:= L15],
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%Part 3.20:
L15: c with [PC:= if nonempty ?( outgoing_edges(c‘two ,c‘g1))
then L7
else (if c‘Node(c‘one)‘oec =0
then LFALSE
else TG_EDGE endif) endif],
%Part 3.21:
L16: c with [PC:=
% checks if edge has right needed else
if member(r,(c‘db(x,y))) then LTRUE else TG_EDGE endif],
%Part 3.22:
LTRUE : LTRUE(c) with [PC:= LEND],
%Part 3.23:
LFALSE : LFALSE(c) with [PC:= LEND],
%Part 3.24:
LEND: c
Endcases
%Part 2:
can_share(num: nat , r: Rights , x: Vertex , y: Vertex , initial:
L_Graph ): Recursive L_Graph = if num =0 then
initial with [PC:=L00]
else
sw(can_share(num-1 ,r,x,y,initial),r,x,y)
endif measure num
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%Part 1:
Can_Share_correct : THEOREM FORALL ( initial : L_Graph): FORALL(num:
nat | can_share(num , read , X, Z, initial)‘PC=LEND):
can_share(num , read , X, Z, initial)‘shared = true
END Can_Share
Part 1 is the theorem Can Share correct which calls the recursive function
Can Share in Part 2.
Part 2 in turn calls the function sw, Part 3, which is the case statements and
what the recursive call from Part 2 cycles through using the program counter (PC).
Part 3.1 and 3.2 initialize the graph and do the first round of error checking. If
the edge is not found with the correct right, go to Part 3.3 to try to find a path to
share rights or if it is found with the correct right, go to Part 3.22 which sets shared
to true.
Part 3.3 checks to see if the graph has at least 3 vertices. If it does not, go to
Part 3.33 which will set shared to false. Proving there were at least 3 nodes in the
graph was not accomplished.
In Part 3.4 each vertices node attributes are set. L2 calls the loop action L2
which in turn calls the set Nodefunction in Node ops. then goes to Part 3.5
Part 3.5 makes sure the node to share to, in this example Z, has incoming edges
by checking the cardinality of the incoming edge variable set for Z. Another difficulty
in the proof has to do with referencing the variable iec. If the vertex does have
incoming edges denoted by the cardinality being greater than zero, go to Part 3.6 else
go to Part 3.33.
Part 3.6 calls the loop action L4 which calls the function find find last edge
from Node ops. This makes sure there are edges actually going into the node to share
from with the set of rights needed. In this case Z has an incoming read edge. Then
Part 3.7 is called.
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TG EDGE in Part 3.7 finds the first edge to enact the Can Share rule. It calls
the function TG edge?, then goes to Part 3.8.
Part 3.8 sets the two variable with X’s dest value.
Part 3.9 checks the FOUND variable. If “un” is the member of FOUND then
Part 3.7 is called again, if “no” is the member then Part 3.23 is called because shared
will be false; otherwise continue to Part 3.10.
Part 3.10 checks to see if c′two (X’s Destination vertex) has incidental edges. If
it does go to Part 3.11 else go back to Part 3.7.
Part 3.11 checks to see if c′two’s (Y) selected incidental edge (e3) contains a
good node for the vertex to share from (Z). If it does not contain a good node go to
Part 3.15. If it does contain a good node check verify again that it contains the right
needed then go to Part 3.12 else go to Part 3.15.
Part 3.12 this calls the loop function L9 which calls Node update. Then Part
3.17 is called.
Part 3.13 is the same as 3.12 except the right sent to the loop action L9 is take.
Part 3.14 is the same as the Part 3.11 and 3.12 except the right sent to the Loop
action L9 is grant.
Part 3.15 checks to see if edge in c′two’s e3, the selected incidental edge has a
take edge. If it does Part 3.13 is called otherwise Part 3.16 is called.
Part 3.16 checks to see if edge in c′two’s e3, the selected incidental edge has a
take edge. If it does, Part 3.14 is called otherwise Part 3.19 is called.
Part 3.17 this sets the c′three variable. In this example it is set to Z. If the
graph was bigger it would be set to a different vertex. Then, Part 3.18 is called.
Part 3.18 this calls the loop function L13 and adds the new edge to the graph
and the right to the edge database. The right added is the right that was entered for
the theorem. Then Part 3.17 is called.
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Part 3.19 calls the loop action L14 to go find another edge, by calling the
Find edge out? function from the tgedge theory. Then calls Part 3.20.
Part 3.20 checks to see if the c′two still has outgoing edges. If it does then Part
3.10 is called. If c′one (X) still has outgoing edges go to Part 3.7 else go to Part 3.23.
In Part 3.21 the newly added edge is checked to see if the right needed is part
of its edge rights. If it is then Part 3.22 is called. If not, then Part 3.7 is called.
Part 3.22 is called if Can Share is true. Then goes to Part 3.24 by setting PC
equal to LEND.
Part 3.23 is called if Can Share is false. Then goes to Part 3.24 by setting PC
equal to LEND.
Part 3.24 is the end of the switch statement and signals the end of the recursion.
This code as stated above is typechecked, but yet unproved. The issues that
continually occur concern the edge functions, outgoing edges, incoming edges, inci-
dental edges and the cardinality of them. Each use of node attributes appears to
induce another round of recursion, which is likely the reason during the proof, the
proof tree grew continually.
4.6 Summary
This chapter discusses hate PVS Prover and provides detailed examples of proof
session to solve the TCCs and theorems for both model specifications, as well as
Can Share code. Chapter 5 discusses the results of this research.
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V. Conclusions
5.1 Significance of Findings
The two Take-Grant rule specification models along with the Can Share predi-
cate automated in PVS are an important step in automating a safety proof for a given
computer system. The first research goal of implementing the rules was accomplished.
However, what originally seemed an easy problem, proved to be more complicated,
which inspired two separate specification models.
The first model has no error checking and uses a straightforward method of
incorporating the required data correctly for each theorem. Each time a function is
required to prove the theorem, the graph is initialized before that function can be
called. Model 1 is somewhat unwieldy and prone to human error due to the manual
data entry. It is time consuming to do manual error checking since PVS typechecking
and prover are of limited help if data are entered incorrectly into the functions.
Model 2 with error checking is more user friendly. Once the algorithm for each
rule is correctly transformed into code, the user can test different theorems against
the initialized graph. The Can Share code allows theorems to be reused for any graph
initialized.
The Take-Grant rules which originally were thought to be simple to implement
in PVS turned out to be a challenge. Instead of being able to implement a complete
system with subjects and objects, the rules were implemented using a subject only
digraph and are too simplistic for a real computer system.
The goal of proving the consistency of formal model specifications and proving
an application of the Take-Grant rules produce a valid model was partially proved.
The individual Take-Grant rules did indeed produce a valid model. The power of the
Take-Grant Protection Model is in the predicates, like Can Share, which produces a
better representation of a valid model.
The contributed labelled digraph theory was submitted to NASA Langley and
is currently under review for inclusion in their PVS libraries.
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5.2 PVS Issues
There are several issues associated with using the Prototype Verification System.
PVS has a steep learning curve–it is not easily learned. It is estimated that a skilled
computer scientist will require approximately six months to become proficient in PVS.
Because the PVS user community is not large, it is sometimes difficult to get assistance
with problems. There is a PVS help site, which provides limited help and question
posting capability.
The documentation for PVS is not geared towards the beginner as it assumes
familiarity with proof concepts and mechanical theorem proving structure. PVS is a
logic language and not programming language. Therefore, to reason about algorithms
or programs individuals must create infrastructure, namely a “state”. Learning to
write a formal specification is a big challenge–conceptualizing the difference between
writing a mathematical specification and programming, involves learning to think
“functionally.”
Training classes for PVS are held every couple of years. This year a class was
offered, however it occurred late in the thesis process. Discussions on implementing
the Take-Grant Model during the class, indicated this research is better suited for a
PhD-level effort.
One of the problems that became apparent after implementing the Model 2
specification was PVS does not support standard programming constructs such as
iteration. Rather, bounded recursion is used to express an iteration, which caused
several problems due to the depth of the recursive calls. Another problem is there is
no visual representation of the digraph after changes are made–it all must be tested
with error checking or crafting appropriate theorems.
5.3 Future Research
Future research should include completing the proof of Can Share code, which
is a key predicate for the Take-Grant Protection Model and developing a proof of the
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Can Know predicate which is key for describing the flow of information. Because the
current rules do not resemble an actual system, adaptation of the current rules to use
a subject/object digraph is also necessary. Adapting the model to incorporate modal
logic will likely result in a more powerful and expressive model.
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Appendix A. PVS Theories
To get additional proofs and/or the theory files please contact:
Air Force Institute of Technology
Dr. Rusty Baldwin
email: rusty.baldwin@afit.edu
phone: 937-255-6565 x4445
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